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PARTISAN BALANCE WITH BITE
Brian D. Feinstein*
Daniel J. Hemel**
(forthcoming 118 COLUM. L. REV. __ (2018); Sept. 12, 2017 draft)
Dozens of multimember agencies across the federal government are subject
to partisan balance requirements, which mandate that no more than a simple
majority of agency members may hail from a single party. Administrative law
scholars and political scientists have questioned whether these provisions
meaningfully affect the ideological composition of federal agencies. In theory,
Presidents can comply with these requirements by appointing ideologically
sympathetic members of the opposite party once they have filled their quota of sameparty appointees (i.e., a Democratic President can appoint liberal Republicans or a
Republican President can appoint conservative Democrats). No multi-agency study
in the past 50 years, however, has examined whether—in practice—partisan balance
requirements actually prevent Presidents from selecting likeminded individuals for
cross-party appointments.
This article fills that gap. We gather data on 578 appointees to 23 agencies
over the course of six presidencies and 36 years. We identify the estimated
ideological preferences of those appointees based on personal campaign
contributions. We then compare the ideological preferences of co-party and crossparty appointees across agencies and across presidencies. Our analysis indicates
that partisan balance requirements had at most a modest impact on the ideological
composition of multimember agencies from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, but a
stronger effect from the mid-1990s onward. We then consider several possible
explanations for these findings. Our results are consistent with a story of “partisan
sort”: as ideology and party affiliation have become more tightly linked, cross-party
appointees have become more likely to share the ideological preferences of their copartisans rather than those of the appointing President. Our findings suggest that the
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increasing polarization of political parties is contributing to a concomitant increase
in the ideological heterogeneity of multimember agencies subject to partisan balance
mandates.
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INTRODUCTION
Partisan balance requirements are a common—and controversial—feature of
federal agency design. These provisions generally mandate that only a bare majority
of commissioners of a multimember agency can hail from the same political party.
More than half of all multimember agencies within the federal government are now
subject to these party balance rules, ranging from little-known entities like the
African Development Foundation to high-profile agencies such as the Federal
Communications Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission.1 Yet
despite the prevalence of partisan balance requirements, scholars of administrative
law lack even a basic understanding of how these mandates affect the ideological
composition and policy outputs of multimember agencies. This article sheds light on
partisan balance requirements and their consequences.
A number of commentators have expressed doubt as to whether partisan
balance requirements (PBRs) materially affect the ideological composition of
multimember agencies. They point out that Presidents can comply with the letter of
the law simply by selecting an appointee who is nominally registered as a member of
the opposite party or as an independent, even if that individual is otherwise the
President’s ideological ally. This view was perhaps most clearly stated in a 1976
report commissioned by the Senate Commerce Committee, which averred that
neither Republican nor Democrat Presidents had chosen “‘bona fide, honest-to-God’
members of the other party” to fill cross-party seats.2
Until we can determine empirically whether PBRs meaningfully constrain a
President’s ability to appoint ideologically sympathetic commissioners to
multimember agencies, it is difficult to say much about the positive or normative
implications of these statutory requirements. And yet in the last half century, not a
single academic article has systematically examined whether and how PBRs affect
the ideological composition of the agencies to which they apply. One study has
sought to measure the effect of partisan balance on voting patterns at the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) specifically, 3 and a handful of scholars have
offered anecdotal observations that speak to this question.4 But for the last
systematic, cross-agency empirical analysis of the effect of PBRs on the ideological

1

See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent (and Executive) Agencies, 98
Cornell L. Rev. 769, 797 tbl.4 (2013).
2
James M. Graham & Victor H. Kramer, Appointments to the Regulatory Agencies: The Federal
Communications Commission and the Federal Trade Commission, 1949-1974, at 386 (Comm. Print.
1976) (prepared for the S. Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong.).
3
Daniel E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of Statutory Partisan Requirements on
Regulation (Feb. 12, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://dho.stanford.edu/research/partisan.pdf;
see also Wenmouth Williams, Jr., Impact of Commissioner Background on FCC Decisions: 19621975, 20 J. Broad. 239, 241 (1976) (providing an earlier look at FCC voting patterns).
4
See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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composition of agencies, we have to look all the way back to a 1964 study by
political scientists Stuart Nagel and Martin Lubin.5
A lot has changed since 1964. Back then, both major political parties were
ideological “big tents”: the Democratic Party included a staunchly conservative
Southern base, which found itself to the right of “Rockefeller Republicans” from the
North on several major issues.6 By the turn of the 21st century, however, partisan
identity had become a much more reliable predictor of ideology—a phenomenon
known as “partisan sort.”7 Meanwhile, developments in campaign finance law,
information technology, and empirical social science have made individual ideology
much easier to observe. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 for the first
time required candidates and political parties to disclose the identities of their
contributors as well as the amounts donated.8 Those records have been open to the
public in a computer-searchable form since 1980,9 and have been posted on the
Internet in a searchable format since 1998.10 While an individual’s campaign
contributions are not a perfect proxy for ideology, recent political science research
suggests that donations closely track ideological preferences. 11 By leveraging
information on campaign contributions made by individuals across several election
cycles, researchers can distinguish among liberals, moderates, and conservatives
within the same political party—both inside and out of government—in a much more
reliable way than past generations of scholars possibly could.
All this means that we are long overdue for a comprehensive, cross-agency
empirical analysis of the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of
multimember boards and commissions. This article fills that void. Before delving
5

Stuart Nagel & Martin Lubin, Regulatory Commissioners and Party Politics, 17 Admin. L. Rev. 39
(1964).
6
See Eric Schickler, Kathryn Pearson, & Brian D. Feinstein, Congressional Parties and Civil Rights
Politics from 1933 to 1972, 72 J. Pol. 672 (2010) (describing how northern Democrats took the lead
on advancing civil rights legislation beginning in the 1940s, with Republicans in the middle – offering
tepid support and occasional behind-the-scenes opposition – and with southern Democrats firmly
opposed); Sean Farhang & Ira Katznelson, The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New
Deal and Fair Deal, 19 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 1 (2005) (describing a similar dynamic regarding labor
issues).
7
See Matthew Levendusky, The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives
Became Republicans (2009) (defining the term “partisan sort”).
8
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, 14-15, 17, §§ 304,
308(a)(4).
9
Telephone Interview with Senior Public Affairs Specialist, Public Records Branch, Federal Election
Commission (May 30, 2017); accord 49 Fed. Reg. 22335-01 (May 29, 1984) (setting fees for Freedom
of Information Act requests concerning “computer search[es] of an entire individual contributor file
for contributions made by a particular individual or individuals”).
10
Press Release, Federal Election Commission, FEC Launches New Web Info, July 21, 1998,
available at http://classic.fec.gov/press/press1998/websrch.htm (last visited June 20, 2017). The FEC
first made available online “comprehensive computer files containing campaign finance information”
in 1996 and introduced a search function two years later. Id.
11
See Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace, 58 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 367 (2014).
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into the analysis, we consider two explanations as to why limitations on the partisan
composition of agencies might affect the ideological composition of multimember
agencies: a supply-side theory and a demand-side theory. (We also consider
alternative theories that focus on search costs and identity signaling.) The supplyside theory posits that there is only a small pool of liberal Republicans and
conservative Democrats who are potentially qualified to serve as commissioners, and
so Presidents looking for competent cross-party appointees whose ideological
preferences track their own will often find themselves out of luck. Thus, Presidents
who are required by PBRs to make cross-party appointments to multimember
agencies will be compelled by supply-side constraints to choose a genuine crosspartisan. Whereas the supply-side theory focuses on the first stage of the
appointment process (the selection of a nominee), the demand-side theory focuses on
the end stage: confirmation. The demand-side theory emphasizes that nominees to
federal agencies ultimately must be “sold” to the Senate, since a majority vote of the
Senate is necessary for confirmation. On this view, consumers in the confirmation
market (i.e., senators) demand cross-party appointees who are bona fide members of
that party, and thus force the President to choose commissioners from the other side
of the ideological spectrum.
The supply-side and demand-side theories both suggest that PBRs will affect
the ideological composition of multimember agencies, but they generate different
predictions as to when and why. If the supply-side theory is correct, then we would
expect to see the effect of PBRs growing over time in tandem with partisan sort. If
the demand-side theory is correct, then we would expect to see the effect of PBRs
most strongly in periods of divided government, when the opposition party in the
Senate has leverage to force the President’s hand.
To assess the effect of PBRs and test these and other theories, we gather data
on the identities of 578 appointees to twenty-three agencies over the course of six
presidencies and thirty-six years (1979 through 2014). We then use data on those
individuals’ campaign contributions to estimate their ideological preferences. We
compare the (estimated) ideological preferences of appointees to those of their
appointing Presidents, and we compare co-party appointees (i.e., a Democrat
appointed by a Democratic President or a Republican appointed by a Republican
President) to cross-party appointees (i.e., a Republican appointed by a Democratic
President or vice-versa). We show how the effects of PBRs on the ideological
composition of federal agencies vary over time and with changes in control of
Congress.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that partisan balance
requirements do “bite.” When Presidents are required by law to make cross-party
appointments, they generally choose “bona fide, honest-to-God” members of the
opposite party—or, at least, individuals whose observed ideologies are significantly
different than the President’s own. Looking at the 36-year period overall, Republican
Presidents appoint Democrats who are more liberal than themselves and more liberal
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than their Republican co-party appointees. Likewise, Democratic Presidents appoint
Republicans who are more conservative than themselves and than their Democratic
co-party appointees.
Second, the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of multimember
agencies is much more pronounced today than it was at the beginning of our study
period. This finding is consistent with the supply-side theory and our expectations
based on partisan sort. President Jimmy Carter often named relatively moderate
Republicans as cross-party appointees; Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W.
Bush often appointed centrist or conservative Democrats. By the time of President
Bill Clinton, however, this phenomenon had subsided. Republicans appointed by
Presidents Clinton and Barack Obama tended to be quite conservative, and
Democrats appointed by President George W. Bush tended to be quite liberal.
Third, we find no apparent relationship between the presence or absence of
divided government and the ideological distance between the President and crossparty appointees. This finding is at odds with the demand-side theory, which would
lead us to expect the effect to be most pronounced when the White House and the
Senate are controlled by different parties. While we do not dismiss the demand-side
explanation entirely, our analysis suggests that supply-side factors do more to
mediate the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of multimember agencies.
We conclude by considering the implications of our empirical analysis for the
scholarly understanding of PBRs. We identify three main accounts of partisan
balance requirements in the administrative law literature. One account, which pulls
insights from political science, posits that PBRs reduce the costs borne by Congress
in monitoring agency actions (the monitoring account). On this view, PBRs ensure
that agencies include members whose policy preferences diverge from the sitting
President’s, and these minority members will alert lawmakers if members from the
President’s party stray from legislators’ preferences.12 A second account, drawing on
the social psychology literature, suggests that PBRs can improve agencies’
deliberative processes by offsetting tendencies toward group polarization (the
deliberative account).13 According to this view, PBRs ensure that multimember
agencies include a diverse set of perspectives, thereby counterbalancing tendencies
toward group polarization. Apart from any effect on the cost of congressional
monitoring, this account suggests that PBRs can improve federal administration by
raising the quality of agency decisionmaking.14 A third account, rooted in
constitutional law scholarship on the “unitary executive,” posits that PBRs obstruct
the President in the execution of her constitutional responsibilities (the obstruction
12

See infra Subsection I.B.1.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 Yale L.J. 71, 74
(2000) (defining group polarization as involving “members of a deliberating group predictably
mov[ing] toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation
tendencies”).
14
See infra Subsection I.B.2.
13
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account).15 According to this view, PBRs “quite literally force Presidents to rely on
their political enemies to carry out their executive duties,”16 and thus potentially
prevent Presidents from implementing their policy agendas.17
These three accounts are not mutually exclusive: in theory, PBRs could
reduce the cost to Congress of monitoring multimember agencies, counterbalance
tendencies toward group polarization within agencies, and force Presidents to rely on
their political enemies. Moreover, these three perspectives on PBRs all rest on the
same empirical premise: that PBRs actually operate as meaningful constraints on the
President’s ability to appoint commissioners who share her ideology and policy
preferences. Our findings shore up that empirical premise, though they fall short of
confirming the more ambitious claims that each account makes. Our analysis also
indicates that the effects of PBRs on the operation of multimember agencies are
potentially quite different today than they were three decades ago, when PBRs had a
less dramatic effect on ideological composition. This finding suggests that
conclusions regarding PBRs drawn from the period before partisan sort should be
reassessed anew. Finally, and perhaps counterintuitively, we suggest that for those
who are concerned about presidential control over multimember agencies, the fact
that PBRs are relatively effective actually makes them less threatening to the sitting
President. We explain our rationale for this counterintuitive conclusion at greater
length below.18
For the optimist, our results might suggest that there is an unexpected upside
to partisan sort: as the parties become less ideologically diverse, multimember
agencies become more so. While the phenomenon of partisan sort has fueled
concerns about group polarization in government institutions,19 our results suggest
that the combination of partisan sort and partisan balance requirements improves the
prospects for ideological diversity within multimember agencies. We caution,
though, that sweeping normative conclusions are premature: our study addresses the
effect of PBRs on the ideological diversity of multimember agencies, not the effect
of ideological diversity on agency functioning. We cannot yet claim that PBRs are
15

Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Johnjerica Hodge, and Wesley W. Wintermyer, Partisan Balance
Requirements in the Age of New Formalism, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 941 (2015).
16
Id. at 991.
17
Id. at 995.
18
In brief, PBRs ensure that Presidents inherit commissions with only a bare majority of members
from the opposition party. For a commission with fixed terms for appointees and a PBR, this means
that in expectation, it will take less time for a new President to “flip” the commission to include a
majority of her party’s members than it would for an otherwise identical multimember commission
with a fixed-term provision and no PBR.
19
See David A. Jones, The Polarizing Effect of a Partisan Workplace, 46 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 67
(2013) (reporting evidence of group polarization at federal and other inside-the-Beltway workplaces);
see also James B. Stewart, Case Study in Chaos: How Management Experts Grade a Trump White
House, N.Y. Times (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/business/donald-trumpmanagement-style.html (reporting management expert’s concerns regarding “group think” in Trump
administration).
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desirable because ideologically diverse agencies function better than agencies with
monolithic memberships. What we can say is that for such a claim to be true, it must
first be true that PBRs actually lead to more ideologically diverse agencies, and our
results strongly affirm that first premise.
While our study is primarily backward-looking, our findings have clear
implications going forward for the evaluation of cross-party appointments under
President Trump and subsequent administrations. Without knowing whether past
Presidents have named genuine cross-partisans to PBR agencies, it is difficult to
determine whether a new White House occupant is acting consistent with established
norms. So far, President Trump has been slow to fill vacancies on PBR agencies—
though especially slow to make cross-party nominations. As of this writing,
President Trump had nominated thirty-one individuals to positions on the twentythree boards and commissions with statutory or informal PBRs that we consider
here,20 only five of whom were cross-party appointments. Notably, the five
Democrats nominated by President Trump to cross-party seats on PBR agencies all
have strong Democratic credentials.21 At the same time, a President potentially can
20

See Tracking How Many Key Positions Trump Has Filled So Far, Wash. Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-administration-appointee-tracker/database
(last visited Sept. 11, 2017).
21
Jessica Rosenworcel, a Trump appointee to the FCC, is a former Senate Democratic staffer who
was appointed by President Obama to a Democratic seat on the commission and contributed $2,700 to
Hillary Clinton during the 2016 campaign. See Biography of Former Commissioner Jessica
Rosenworcel, Fed. Comm’cns Comm’n, https://www.fcc.gov/biography-former-commissionerjessica-rosenworcel (last updated Jan. 4, 2017); Donor Lookup, OpenSecrets.org,
https://www.opensecrets.org/donor-lookup/results?name=Jessica+Rosenworcel (last visited July 10,
2017) (search results for “Jessica Rosenworcel”). Jason Kearns, a Trump appointee to be chairman of
the U.S. International Trade Commission, is a former House Democratic staffer who donated $1,000
to Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential bid and who was previously nominated by President Obama to
that post. See Press Release, Ways & Means Comm. Democrats, U.S. House of Representatives, Neal,
Levin Statements on Nomination of Jason Kearns for International Trade Commission (Jan. 18,
2017), https://democrats-waysandmeans.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/neal-levin-statementsnomination-jason-kearns-international-trade;
Donor
Lookup,
OpenSecrets.org,
https://www.opensecrets.org/donor-lookup/results?name=Jason+Kearns (last visited July 10, 2017)
(search results for “Jason Kearns”). Rostin Behnam, a Trump appointee to the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, was an aide to Democratic Senator Debbie Stabenow of Michigan and donated
a total of $5,150 to Hillary Clinton during the primary and general election campaigns. See Gabriel T.
Rubin & Andrew Ackerman, White House to Nominate Russ Behnam as CFTC Commissioner, Wall
St. J. (July 12, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-to-nominate-russ-behnam-as-cftccommissioner-1499889964; Donor Lookup, OpenSecrets.org, https://www.opensecrets.org/donorlookup/results?name=rostin+behnam (last visited July 16, 2017) (search results for “Rostin
Behnam”). Richard Glick, a Trump nominee to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, is a
Democratic Senate aide with a long record of donations to Democratic candidates. See Robert
Walton, Trump To Nominate Democratic Senate Aid Richard Glick to FERC, Utility Dive (June 29,
2017), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/trump-to-nominate-democratic-senate-aide-richard-glick-toferc/446151;
Donor
Lookup,
OpenSecrets.org,
https://www.opensecrets.org/donorlookup/results?name=richard+glick (last visited Aug. 10, 2017) (search results for “Richard Glick”).
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skew the composition of PBR agencies by quickly making co-party appointments
while stalling on cross-party nominations.22 It is premature to say whether the Trump
administration is pursuing such a strategy. What we can say is that by documenting
past practices regarding appointments to PBR agencies, our study establishes a
baseline that can facilitate future comparative evaluations.
Our article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background on PBRs,
reviews the existing literature on these requirements, and considers causal pathways
by which these requirements might affect the ideological composition of
multimember agencies. Part II describes our data and methodology and presents our
main empirical results. Part III discusses the implications of our results and identifies
areas for future research.
I. PARTISAN BALANCE REQUIREMENTS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND EXISTING EVIDENCE
This first Part provides an overview of partisan balance requirements in
agency organic statutes and considers reasons why these requirements might (or
might not) affect the ideological makeup of boards and commissions. Section I.A
briefly summarizes the history of partisan balance requirements. Section I.B surveys
the literature on the efficacy of partisan balance requirements. Section I.C considers
causal pathways through which PBRs might operate and explains how these different
causal stories can be disentangled.
A. A Short History of Partisan Balance Requirements
Partisan balance requirements for federal agencies date at least as far back as
the Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act of 1882.23 The Act prohibited polygamists from
voting or running in Utah elections. A new Utah Commission was tasked with
And Jeff Baran, a Democratic member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission who was renominated
by President Trump, is also a former Democratic congressional aide who was initially appointed by
President Obama and who made contributions to both the Obama and Hillary Clinton presidential
campaigns. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald J. Trump
Announces Intent to Nominate Personnel to Key Administration Posts (Aug. 25, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/25/president-donald-j-trump-announces-intentnominate-personnel-key; Commissioner Jeff Baran, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n,
https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/organization/commission/baran.html (last updated Sept. 5, 2017);
Donor Lookup, OpenSecrets.org, https://www.opensecrets.org/donor-lookup/results?name=jeff+baran
(last visited Sept. 11, 2017) (search results for “Jeff Baran”).
22
Bloomberg News observed in June 2017 that President Trump “has been aggressive in moving to
fill open Republican seats at the CFTC” but “hasn’t yet tapped any Democrats to join the CFTC.”
Benjamin Bain, Lone Democrat on U.S. Swaps Regulator to Leave Before Term Ends, Bloomberg
(June 20, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-20/lone-democrat-on-u-s-swapsregulator-to-leave-before-term-ends. Several weeks later, President Trump nominated a Democrat to
the commission. See Rubin & Ackerman, supra note 21.
23
Act of Mar. 22, 1882, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882); see Krotoszynski et al., supra note 15, at 964.
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enforcing the anti-polygamy requirements. Section 9 of the Act stated that the board
should consist of “five persons, to be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, not more than three of whom shall be members of
one political party.”24 Similar PBRs appeared in several more 19th century statutes,
including the Pendleton Act of 1883, which created the Civil Service Commission;25
the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,26 which created the Interstate Commerce
Commission; and an 1890 law establishing a nine-member board of general
appraisers that would ascertain the value of merchandise for customs purposes.27
Congress also included PBRs in a number of statutes creating commissions to
negotiate treaties with Indian tribes at the century’s end. 28 Perhaps not
coincidentally, the 1880s also saw a national movement for civil service reform, and
these first PBRs limited the President’s ability to adopt a “to the victor go the spoils”
posture in appointments.29 Yet these first few PBRs do not appear to have elicited
much discussion in the House or in the Senate, and—speculation aside—the initial
reason for their insertion remains obscure.30
The presidency of Woodrow Wilson brought with it the next golden age of
PBRs. Wilson’s first term saw the creation of five major multimember agencies with
PBRs in their organic statutes: the Federal Trade Commission,31 the Federal Farm
Loan Board,32 the U.S. Shipping Board,33 the U.S. Employees’ Compensation
Commission,34 and the United States Tariff Commission.35 At the time, senators
suggested that PBRs would make agencies less prone to partisan bias and more likely
to act on the basis of expertise—though precisely how PBRs might produce these
results remained unspecified.36
The creation of new agencies with PBRs in their organic statutes has
continued ever since. In the last century, Congress has established at least 40 bodies
subject to PBRs.37 Most of these statutes provide for an odd number of members, no
24

Act of Mar. 22, 1882, ch. 47, § 9, 22 Stat. at 32 (emphasis added).
Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403; see Krotoszynski et al., supra note 15, at 966.
26
Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
27
Act of June 10, 1890, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131, 136.
28
See Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 412, § 14, 25 Stat. 980, 1005; Act of Aug. 19, 1890, ch. 807, 26 Stat.
336, 354; Act of July 13, 1892, ch. 164, 27 Stat. 120, 138, 139; Act of June 10, 1896, ch. 398, 29 Stat.
321, 342. Justice Brandeis documents the early history of PBRs in his dissent in Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 240, 270 n.51 (1926).
29
See Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 Yale
L.J. 1362, 1389 (2010).
30
See Krotoszynski et al., supra note 15, at 964-65, 967.
31
Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717.
32
Act of July 17, 1916, ch. 245, § 3, 39 Stat. 360.
33
Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 451, § 3, 39 Stat. 728, 729.
34
Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 458, § 28, 39 Stat. 742, 748.
35
Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 700, 39 Stat. 756, 795.
36
See Krotoszynski et al., supra note 15, at 969--70.
37
See id. at 1009-1017 tbls.1--3.
25
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more than a bare majority of whom may be from the same political party. The
organic statutes of a small handful of agencies (most significantly, the Federal
Election Commission) provide for an even number of members, with no more than
half from the same party.38
Significantly, the PBR provisions in agency organic statutes do not
technically require a Democratic President to appoint Republicans or a Republican
President to appoint Democrats. For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s organic statute states that “not more than three [of the five
commissioners] shall be members of the same political party.”39 Thus, a Republican
President could appoint three Republican commissioners and two independents (or,
for that matter, two Libertarians), rather than naming two Democrats. In practice,
though, we see very few cases of Presidents naming independents to cross-party
posts on PBR agencies. Indeed, in our review of 216 cross-party appointments to 23
PBR agencies over the 1979-2014 time period, we have identified only seven cases
in which a President named an independent at a time when a PBR prohibited him
from appointing a member of his own party to an agency.
These seven cases, moreover, do not suggest a pattern of Presidents
attempting to manipulate PBRs by filling cross-party seats with likeminded
independents. Three of the seven cases involved a Democratic President filling a
cross-party seat with an appointee who, though registered as an independent, had
previously worked as an aide to a Republican senator.40 Two more involved
Republican Presidents filling cross-party seats with independents who would later be
chosen by Democratic Presidents for positions to which the Democratic President
could have named a Democrat—an indication that the individual, though registered
as an independent, was generally aligned with the Democratic Party. 41 One case
38

See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 1, 90 Stat. 475,
475 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1)). Other extant agencies with an even number of
members and a requirement that no more than half hail from the same party include the International
Trade Commission, 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a), and the Election Assistance Commission, 52 U.S.C. §
20923.
39
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a).
40
The three are: Don Zimmerman, appointed by President Carter to the NLRB in 1980; Reginald
Jones, appointed by President Clinton to the EEOC in 1996; and Jackie Clegg, appointed by Clinton
to the Export-Import Bank in 1997. See James A. Gross, Broken Promise: The Subversion of U.S.
Labor Relations Policy, 1947-1994, at 245-46 (1995) (noting that Zimmerman had served as an
adviser to Republican Senator Jacob Javits of New York); Lee Davidson, Utah Nominee Gets High
Marks, Deseret News (Salt Lake City) (May 23, 1997) (noting that Clegg had served as an aide to
Republican Senator Jake Garn of Utah); Press Release, White House, President Clinton Names
Reginald Jones to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (June 5, 1996) (noting that Jones
was at the time senior legislative counsel to Republican Senator James Jeffords of Vermont).
41
The two are: Mary Schapiro, appointed by President Reagan to the SEC in 1988 and reappointed by
President George H.W. Bush in 1989; and Thomas Curry, appointed to the FDIC by President George
W. Bush in 2003. See Vicky Stamas, President to Nominate Reum to Fill Position Remaining at the
SEC, Bond Buyer, Aug. 21, 1992, at 5 (noting that Schapiro was independent in cross-party seat);
Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Clinton Expected to Name S.E.C. Member to Head C.F.T.C., N.Y. Times
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involved President Clinton appointing an independent to the National Transportation
Safety Board who had been recommended by the Board’s outgoing Republican
member.42 Indeed, in only one case did we find any record of complaints that the
President had appointed an independent rather than a member of the opposite party
to fill a cross-party seat. 43
The only agency at which Presidents have repeatedly sought to fill crossparty seats with ideologically sympathetic independents is—perhaps surprisingly—
an agency with no regulatory authority: the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. 44 (We
exclude the Commission on Civil Rights from our dataset because of its lack of
authority to bind others through regulation, adjudication, or enforcement, as well as
the fact that half of its members are chosen by Congress rather than the President and
its members generally serve part-time.45) The commission’s organic statute states
that “[n]ot more than 4 of the [8] members shall at any one time be of the same
(May 3, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/03/business/clinton-expected-to-name-sec-memberto-head-cftc.html (reporting that President Clinton would name Schapiro to chair CFTC at time when
commission already had two Republican members, and so Clinton could have named a fellow
Democrat); Kathleen Pender, Mary Schapiro’s Mixed Marks as SEC Head, S.F. Chron. (Nov. 26,
2012), http://www.sfgate.com/business/networth/article/Mary-Schapiro-s-mixed-marks-as-SEC-head4068463.php (noting that Schapiro, named by President Obama in 2009 to chair the SEC, served with
two Republicans, meaning that Obama could have named a third registered Democrat instead of
Schapiro); Hannah Bergman, FDIC Board Is Factor in OCC Choice, Am. Banker, Jan. 12, 2005, at 1
(noting that Thomas Curry was an independent named by President George W. Bush to a cross-party
seat); Binyamin Appelbaum, Official From F.D.I.C. Picked To Lead Banking Regulator, N.Y. Times
(July 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/02/business/02currency.html (noting President
Obama’s nomination of Curry to be Comptroller of the Currency, a position not subject to a PBR).
42
This was John Goglia, appointed by President Clinton to the NTSB in 1995 and reappointed in
1999. See Matthew Brelis, US Transportation Appointee Brings Hands-On View; 29 Years as Air
Mechanic Won Spot for Saugus Man, Bos. Globe, Oct. 10, 1995, at 18.
43
This was Mary Azcuenaga, named by President Reagan to the FTC in 1984. Her appointment
generated grumbling from one Democratic senator, who “wondered why Mr. Reagan, if he wants to
appoint independents, cannot pick them for Republican seats.” Robert D. Hershey Jr., Washington
Watch:
No
Democrats
Seen
for
F.T.C.,
N.Y.
Times
(Oct.
28,
1985),
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/10/28/business/washington-watch-no-democrats-seen-for-ftc.html
(paraphrasing Senator Wendell Ford, Democrat of Kentucky). However, Azcuenaga was also
reportedly viewed favorably by the outgoing Democratic commissioner whom she replaced. See
Thomas Ferraro, Reagan Expected To Name Woman To Replace FTC’s Pertschuk, UPI (Aug. 14,
1984), http://www.upi.com/Archives/1984/08/14/Reagan-expected-to-name-woman-to-replace-FTCsPertschuk/9862461304000 (quoting aide to outgoing Democratic commissioner who said that the
commissioner “respects” Azcuenaga and was “relatively pleased” that she would be his successor).
44
See Charlie Savage, Manuever Gave Bush a Conservative Rights Panel, Bos. Globe (Nov. 6, 2007),
http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/11/06/maneuver_gave_bush_a_
conservative_rights_panel (“Especially since the 1980s, presidents and lawmakers have tried to tilt the
panel by appointing independents who shared their party's views on civil rights.”).
45
Of the commission’s eight members, four are appointed by the President, two are appointed by the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate on the recommendation of the Senate Majority and Minority
Leaders, and two are appointed by the Speaker of the House on the recommendation of the House
Majority and Minority Leaders. 42 U.S.C. § 1974(b).
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political party.”46 The meaning of this provision was tested in 2003 and 2004, when
two Republican members of the commission changed their registration to
independent.47 Their switches allowed President George W. Bush to name two
additional Republicans to the commission, bringing the number of Republican or
recently-Republican members of the panel to six.48 At the time, the Office of Legal
Counsel in the Justice Department issued an opinion stating that, for purposes of the
statutory PBR, “the relevant consideration is the party affiliation of the other
members at the time the new member is appointed.”49 In the Office of Legal
Counsel’s view, application of the statutory PBR did not require looking beyond
party registration to determine the partisan identity of a prospective or current
commissioner.
Aside from the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion, there is very little legal
precedent regarding the interpretation or application of partisan balance requirements
in agency organic statutes. The constitutionality of PBRs has been challenged in two
cases, but the courts did not reach the merits of the constitutional issue in either case.
In Federal Election Commission v. NRA Political Victory Fund, the National Rifle
Association’s political action committee argued that the provision in the six-member
Federal Election Commission’s organic statute capping the number of
commissioners from any political party at three violated the President’s appointment
power.50 The D.C. Circuit rejected the argument on standing grounds, reasoning that
“it is impossible to determine in this case whether the statute actually limited the
President’s appointment power” because it was not clear that the President otherwise
would have sought to appoint more than three commissioners from his own party.51
In National Committee of the Reform Party v. Democratic National Committee, the
Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to the Federal Election Commission’s partisan
balance requirement on similar grounds, emphasizing that “without the statute the
President could have appointed exactly the same members.”52
We know of no case in which a litigant has sought judicial enforcement of a
PBR—i.e., has argued for the invalidation of an agency action on the grounds that a
commission had too many members of the same party. At the same time, we have
found no reported instances of outright PBR violations—no case, that is, where a
President has sought to exceed the statutory cap on commissioners from a single
party. The letter, if not the spirit, of PBRs is followed uniformly. But to say that
PBRs are followed as a technical matter does not explain what substantive effects
46

Id.
See Savage, supra note 44.
48
Id.
49
Political Balance Requirement for the Civil Rights Commission, 28 Op. O.L.C. 295 , 295 (Dec. 6,
2004).
50
6 F.3d 821, 824-25 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
51
Id.
52
168 F.3d 360, 365 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d at 825) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
47
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these provisions have. The following section turns to that question and surveys the
scant scholarly literature that exists to date.
B. Do Partisan Balance Requirements Bite?
Our central aim is to test the hypothesis that partisan balance requirements
affect the ideological composition of multimember agencies. A contrary view posits
that cross-party commissioners “come in sheep’s clothing” and do not differ from a
President’s co-party appointees in any way other than the superficial fact of party
registration.53 One scholar has noted the example of Ray Wakefield, a nominally
Republican but questionably conservative Roosevelt nominee to the FCC.54 Timothy
Nokken and Brian Sala cite examples from the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, and
Carter administrations.55 An especially notorious example from the Nixon
administration is that of James Quello, a nominally cross-party appointee to the FCC
who—despite his Democratic affiliation—donated $1,100 to Nixon’s reelection
effort in 1972.56 A report commissioned by the Senate Commerce Committee and
completed at the end of the Ford presidency concluded that cross-party appointees
“typically” support the President who selected them.57 Alan Morrison observed at the
end of the Reagan years that the outgoing President had “largely succeeded” in
“placing in all agencies, independent and otherwise, those who believe firmly in the
Reagan view of government—Democrats as well as Republicans.”58 And Senator

53

See Ho, supra note 3 (manuscript at 2--3) (collecting sources that make this claim).
Lawrence W. Lichty, Members of the Federal Radio Commission and Federal Communications
Commission 1927-1961, 6 J. Broad. 23, 25 (1961); accord Wenmouth Williams, Jr., Impact of
Commissioner Background on FCC Decisions: 1962-1975, 20 J. Broad. 239, 241 (1976) (concluding
that “party affiliation has not been a reliable predictor of voting” on the FCC).
55
Timothy P. Nokken & Brian R. Sala, Confirmation Dynamics: A Model of Presidential
Appointments to Independent Agencies, 12 J. Theoretical Pol. 91, 95 (2000). In particular, Nokken
and Sala note that President Eisenhower appointed two nominally Democratic FTC commissioners
whose ideological loyalties were suspect: Robert Secrest, a conservative Democratic Congressman
from Ohio, and William Kern, previously an FTC staff member “whose principal Democratic
credentials were that his father had been William Jennings Bryan’s running mate in 1908.” Nokken
and Sala add that “Kennedy and Nixon adopted similar appointment strategies by appointing liberal
‘Lindsay Republicans’ and conservative ‘Connally Democrats,’ respectively.” And they further
mention the case of Frank Reiche, one of President Carter’s cross-party appointees to the FEC, whom
some Republican senators opposed because he was not sufficiently conservative. Id. at 95 & n.6; see
also Princeton Attorney Confirmed to Post on Election Panel, Ashbury Park (N.J.) Press, July 26,
1979, at 62 (noting that 21 out of 41 Republican senators voted against Reiche, with some
conservative Republicans saying that he did not represent their views).
56
See Graham & Kramer, supra note 2, at 357-367.
57
Id. at 366.
58
Alan B. Morrison, How Independent Are Independent Regulatory Agencies?, 1988 Duke L.J. 252,
253-54.
54

[Vol. 118

Sept. 2017 draft]

PARTISAN BALANCE WITH BITE

Bob Dole once accused President Clinton of appointing “Clinton Republicans” to
cross-party seats.59
We know of only one study other than our own that undertakes a quantitative
cross-commission analysis of the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of
multimember agencies: the 1964 study by Stuart Nagel and Martin Lubin referenced
above. Nagel and Lubin focus on seven commissions: the now-defunct Civil
Aeronautics Board and Interstate Commerce Commission, the FCC, the Federal
Power Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission), the NLRB,
and the SEC. They draw data from three years each spaced a decade apart: 1936,
1946, and 1956.60 They consider a decision to be “liberal” if it goes “in favor of the
consumer, shipper, or investor (rather than the seller, producer, transporter, or
broker), in favor of labor (rather than management), in favor of a small business or
increased competition (rather than a larger firm or decreased competition).”61 They
report whether commissioner are above or below their agencies’ average liberalism
score. On this dimension, Democrats appointed by Republican Presidents are most
likely to be above their agency’s average liberalism score (64%), followed by
Democrats appointed by Democratic Presidents (54%), followed by Republicans
appointed by Democratic Presidents (46%), followed by Republicans appointed by
Republican Presidents (33%).62 The findings are reported in a way that makes it
impossible to determine just how much PBRs affect voting behavior, though the
results seem to suggest that PBRs lead Republican Presidents to choose somewhat
more liberal commissioners and lead Democratic Presidents to select somewhat more
conservative appointees.
While these results are suggestive, Nagel and Lubin’s method of categorizing
decisions as “liberal” and “conservative” is certainly vulnerable to critique. First, the
terms “liberal” and “conservative” are not easy to operationalize—and any attempt to
do so inevitably imports biases. (Why do we think liberals are more likely to favor
“increased competition,” and how should we code cases where the competitive
consequences are hotly disputed?) Second, the types of cases that will reach an
adjudicatory commission may vary with the commission’s ideological
composition—the administrative law version of the Priest-Klein effect familiar from
the civil procedure literature.63 Individual workers and labor unions may be more
likely to bring ambitious cases to the NLRB when they know that the board has a

Al Kamen, Who’s Republican? And Who’s to Decide?, Wash. Post (Sept. 6, 1993),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/09/06/whos-republican-and-whos-todecide/8a85544f-f1a1-4558-ac1f-5c498e5609e6/?utm_term=.a10e33cb8cfe.
60
Nagel & Lubin, supra note 5 at 39.
61
Id. at 40
62
Id. at 42 tbl.1.
63
See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud.
1 (1984) (suggesting that the disputes that reach litigation are ones in which each party has close to a
50% probability of victory).
59
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liberal majority; likewise for employers when they know that the board tilts toward
the right.
Daniel Ho’s methodologically rigorous study of voting patterns among FCC
commissioners addresses the first of these two aforementioned imperfections of the
Nagel and Lubin study. Ho pioneers an approach—a Bayesian multilevel ideal point
model of mixed ordinal votes—to map votes onto a unidimensional spectrum
without requiring researchers to decide which positions are “liberal” and which ones
are “conservative.”64 As Ho summarizes, his analysis of the FCC suggests that most
cross-party appointees are “genuine”: with a small number of exceptions, “[c]rossparty appointees don’t don sheep’s clothing.”65 In other words, Democratic
commissioners appointed by Republican Presidents to satisfy the statutory PBR
appear to be relatively liberal, and Republican commissioners appointed by
Democratic Presidents to satisfy the statutory PBR appear to be relatively
conservative. Somewhat surprisingly, the most conservative commissioner according
to Ho’s estimates is a Republican appointed by Democratic President Clinton, and
the three most liberal commissioners are Democrats appointed by Republican
Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush.66
Ho’s study of the FCC provides us with extraordinarily useful insights
regarding voting behavior at a single agency. But while Ho’s single-agency analysis
suggests that partisan balance requirements do “bite,” it is not clear whether his
FCC-specific results are generalizable to other multimember agencies.67
Unfortunately, Ho’s innovative method cannot be applied broadly beyond the FCC:
his method relies on having a large set of non-unanimous commission votes to
analyze, but at many multimember agencies—including the Federal Election
Commission, Federal Trade Commission, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and
Securities and Exchange Commission—dissents and concurrences are rare.68 For this
reason, we look to other data sources and methodological approaches in order to
assess the cross-agency effects of PBRs.

64

Ho, supra note 3.
Id. (manuscript at 19, 24).
66
Id. (manuscript at 21 fig.4).
67
The FCC is, by many accounts, a particularly politicized agency. See Benjamin Kapnik, Affirming
the Status Quo?: The FCC, ALJs, and Agency Adjudications, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1527, 1528
(2012) (“The FCC has long been considered a politicized agency . . . .”); Philip J. Weiser, Institutional
Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of the Administrative State, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 675, 689
(2009) (noting “super-politicized” environment at FCC). Cf. Kimberly A. Zarkin & Michael J. Zarkin,
The Federal Communications Commission: Front Line in the Culture and Regulation Wars 49 (2006)
(“[T]he FCC is an organization that is particularly open to interference by outside forces.”). While
these characterizations are difficult to verify, they cast doubt on the external validity of FCC-specific
findings.
68
See id. (manuscript at 8 tbl.1) (showing that the number of dissents and concurrences per
commissioner is 172 for the FCC, compared to 4 for the FEC, 12 for the FTC, 3 for the NRC, and 6
for the SEC).
65
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Ho’s study also does not seek to determine why PBRs might be effective. The
next Section turns to that question and sets forth two theories with testable
implications that might explain the efficacy of these provisions. In Part II, we go on
to consider whether PBRs do in fact affect the ideological composition of
multimember agencies, and we assess the evidence in support of our two separate
theories.
C. Why Might Partisan Balance Requirements Bite?
We focus here on two causal mechanisms that might explain why PBRs
affect the ideological composition of multimember agencies: a supply-side theory
and a demand-side theory. In the “market” for commissioners, the President draws
from a limited supply of individuals with the experience and expertise to serve
competently on multimember federal agencies. The President then must “sell” his
nominee to sometimes-skeptical senators—the consumers in our market metaphor. If
PBRs do indeed affect the ideological composition of multimember agencies, it may
be due to supply-side constraints, or demand-side constraints, or both.
1. The Supply-Side Theory
The supply-side theory holds that the President selects from a pool of
potential cross-party appointees that is dominated by individuals whose ideological
preferences differ from the President’s own. Consider the challenge facing a
Democratic President who is filling a seat on the five-member FCC at a time when
the FCC already has three Democratic members (its maximum number of same-party
commissioners). Presumably the President cares at least somewhat about the
competence of commissioners, and so desires an appointee with relevant experience
in communications law or policy. The pool of individuals who have such experience
and who are not members of the Democratic Party will be weighted toward
moderates and conservatives. While it might not be impossible for the Democratic
President to find a liberal non-Democrat who also has relevant qualifications for the
commissionership, it is—at the very least—easier for a Democratic President to draw
liberals from within the President’s own party than from without.
The plausibility of the supply-side theory depends on the strength of the
relationship between partisanship and ideology. If the Republican Party includes
large pools of liberals as well as conservatives, then a Democratic President making
a cross-party appointment can satisfy the PBR by selecting a relatively liberal
Republican. Partisan sort, however, undermines the ability of Democratic Presidents
to find ideologically sympathetic Republicans to fill posts on multimember agencies
(and likewise for Republican Presidents seeking out ideologically sympathetic
Democrats).
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The political science literature on partisan sort distinguishes between “elite
polarization” and “mass polarization.” By “elites” (or alternatively, the “political
class”), we refer to public officials, interest group leaders, activists, substantial
donors, and political commentators.69 While the extent to which mass polarization
has occurred is contested,70 there is close to a consensus that elites have become
more polarized over the course of the past several decades.71 Because appointees to
multimember agencies are generally drawn from the “political class,”72 elite
polarization rather than mass polarization is the more relevant phenomenon for our
purposes. By most measures, the partisan sorting of elites accelerated in the mid- to
late-1970s and has continued to pick up steam ever since.73 On most accounts, the
partisan realignment of the South—with white conservative Democrats moving to
the Republican Party—was an important but nonexclusive factor contributing to
partisan sort.74 Whatever the causes, few scholars would dispute that ideology is a
stronger predictor of partisan affiliation today than it was 25 to 35 years ago.75

69

See Morris P. Fiorina & Matthew S. Levendusky, Disconnected: The Political Class versus the
People, in I Red and Blue Nation?: Characteristics and Causes of America’s Polarized Parties 50
(Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2006).
70
Compare Alan I. Abramowitz & Kyle L. Saunders, Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate,
60 J. Pol. 634, 649 (1998) (“The increasing ideological polarization of the Democratic and Republican
Parties in the Reagan and post-Reagan eras made it easier for voters to recognize the differences
between the parties’ policy stands. As a result, voters have been choosing their party identification on
the basis of their policy preferences rather than maintaining the party allegiance that they inherited
from their parents.”), with Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel A. Abrams & Jeremy C. Pope, Polarization in
the American Public: Misconceptions and Misreadings, 70 J. Pol. 556, 558 (2008) (stating that “party
sorting has proceeded much less in the general public than among party elites”).
71
See Fiorina et al., supra note 70, at 557 (“There is general agreement that party elites have become
significantly more distinct over the course of the past several decades . . . .”).
72
See supra note 107 (comparing the propensity of PBR appointees to contribute to political
candidates to the propensities of Obama appointees, Fortune 500 CEOs, former Supreme Court clerks
to do so).
73
See, e.g., Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, The Polarization of Contemporary American Politics,
46 Polity 411, 415 (2014) (observing— on the basis of voting patterns among members of the House
and Senate—that “the parties began to diverge in the mid-1970s and this trend has continued unabated
into the most recent Congress”); Marc J. Hetherington, Resurgent Mass Polarization: The Role of
Elite Polarization, 95 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 619, 622-23 (2001) (observing—also on the basis of
congressional voting patterns—that polarization reached a “trough” in the mid-1970s but began a
“steady rise” starting with the Carter years, and a “second spike” in the last two years of George H.W.
Bush’s presidency).
74
See Hare & Poole, supra note 73, at 417 (“[T]he southern realignment does not fully account for the
increase in polarization. The Republican Party became much more conservative across all regions of
the United States.”); Gary C. Jacobson, Partisan Polarization in American Politics: A Background
Paper, 43 Presidential Stud. Q. 688, 691 (2013) (stating that the “main source” of polarization was “the
partisan realignment of the South,” but noting that “[c]onservative whites outside the South also
moved toward the Republican Party, while liberals became overwhelmingly Democratic”).
75
See, e.g., Joseph Bafumi & Robert Y. Shapiro, A New Partisan Voter, 71 J. Pol. 1 (2009).
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The following figure provides one window on this partisan sort. The figure
uses DW-NOMINATE ideal point estimates, i.e., estimates of legislators’ ideological
preferences based on their roll call voting records, to track partisan sort over the past
50 years.76 The solid red line charts the median Republican House member’s ideal
point from 1963 (close to the nadir of polarization in the 20th century) through 2013;
the dotted, light blue and dashed, dark blue lines report those values for the median
southern and non-southern Democratic representative, respectively. The figure
illustrates two reasons why partisan sort has occurred: (1) the Republican Party
became more conservative over a half century; and (2) southern (but not northern)
Democrats became more liberal.77 The latter phenomenon is attributable to the fact
that a large number of white conservatives in the South have changed their party
affiliation from Democratic to Republican, leaving a more liberal and largely
African-American Democratic Party in southern states.78

Data derived from Keith Poole & Howard Rosenthal, “Party Medians from DW-NOMINATE,
Congresses 1-113” [data file], Voteview, available at https://legacy.voteview.com/pmediant.htm (last
visited June 20, 2017). DW-NOMINATE arranges legislators on a -1 to 1 scale based on their roll call
voting records, placing legislators with similar voting records close together on the scale. The
measure does not consider the content of the roll call votes. Once the algorithm is run for a large set of
votes, the optimal placement of legislators along with scale makes it obvious to any political observer
that legislators placed near -1 are very liberal and those placed near 1 are very conservative. See Keith
T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (2000).
77
As the figure shows, the trend toward polarization is asymmetric, with greater movement away
from the middle among Republicans than among Democrats. See also Nolan McCarty, Howard
Rosenthal, & Keith T. Poole, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches 12
(2006) (noting that “Republicans in the North and South have moved sharply to the right,” while
“Northern Democrats . . . don’t look sharply different from Democrats of old”).
78
See Nelson Polsby, How Congress Evolves 151 (2005).
76
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Figure 1: Party Polarization in the House of Representatives
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Figure 2 provides another perspective on partisan sort. It shows the gap in
DW-NOMINATE scores for the median Democratic and Republican members of the
House between 1963 and 2013. The takeaway from Figures 1 and 2 is clear: the
parties have become more ideologically distinct over the past 50 years. The increase
has been nearly monotonic, with polarization accelerating in the second half of this
period.
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The phenomenon of partisan sort has clear implications for the ideological
composition of multimember agencies subject to PBRs. In the late 1970s and early
1980s, when both parties remained relatively ideologically heterogeneous at the elite
level, we might expect the effect of PBRs on ideological composition to be muted. A
Democratic President making a cross-party appointment would not be forced to
choose from among conservatives; likewise, a Republican President would likely be
able to find qualified Democrats who were not liberals. But as partisan sort
accelerated over the last two decades of the 20th century and the beginning of the
21st, we might expect the effect of PBRs on ideological composition to grow
stronger. That is, insofar as supply-side constraints account for the effect of PBRs on
the ideological composition of multimember agencies, we might expect that effect to
increase as supply-side constraints become more binding.
Accordingly, one way to assess the plausibility of the supply-side theory is to
look at whether the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of multimember
agencies has increased over time. If it has, then that finding would place the supplyside theory on firmer footing. We will defer further discussion of this point until Part
II, where we conduct tests to determine whether the effect of PBRs on ideological
composition is temporally dependent. But first, we consider whether PBRs might
affect ideological composition through an alternative causal mechanism.
2. The Demand-Side Theory
Once a President has selected a nominee for an agency post, he must “sell”
that nominee to the Senate. The confirmation hurdle imposes a potential demandside constraint on the President’s ability to stock multimember agencies with
ideologically sympathetic appointees. Senators from the opposition party may use
what leverage they have to ensure that the President selects a “bona fide” member of
the opposition party when a PBR forces a cross-party appointment.79 To satisfy
senators—the “consumers” in our market metaphor—the President may have to
honor the spirit of PBRs when choosing cross-party commissioners.
Insofar as demand-side constraints compel Democratic Presidents to choose
conservative Republican commissioners and Republican Presidents to name liberal
Democrats, we might expect these constraints to be most binding under conditions of
divided government. Presumably, the Senate is more likely to stop a Democratic
President from appointing a liberal Republican to satisfy a PBR when the Senate is
Republican-controlled than when the Democrats have a majority (and vice versa
when it is a Republican President seeking to place a conservative Democrat on a
commission). To be sure, even a minority opposition party in the Senate has
79

See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So-Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the
Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 459, 488 (2008) (“[O]pposition Senators regularly use
holds and other delaying strategies to pressure the President to appoint party loyalists to slots held by
opposition-party members.”).
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historically been able to stop a nominee from being confirmed through the filibuster,
provided that it could muster 41 votes. But with the abolition of the filibuster for
agency nominees in November 2013,80 the minority party in the Senate no longer has
this weapon in its arsenal.
The demand-side theory, like the supply-side theory, leads us to expect that
the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of multimember agencies would
vary across time. In particular, we might expect the effect to be strongest when the
White House and Senate are controlled by different parties, and so the Senate can
easily block a cross-party appointee who is ideologically sympathetic to the
President. We might also expect the effect to be especially weak in the few periods
when the President’s party has held a filibuster-proof Senate majority. Our dataset
encompasses two such periods—both under President Obama. First, the Democrats
held 60 Senate seats from July 2009 (after Democrat Al Franken was sworn in as
senator from Minnesota81) until January 2010 (when the Democrats lost a Senate seat
from Massachusetts following Republican Scott Brown’s victory in a special
election).82 And second, after the Senate eliminated the filibuster for votes on the
confirmation of nominees to non-Supreme Court appointments in November 2013,
the Democrats retained a narrow majority until January 2015 (55-45, including two
independents who caucused with the Democrats).
In the next Part, we examine whether PBRs do indeed affect the ideological
composition of multimember agencies—and, if so, why. Our approach allows us to
test both the supply-side and demand-side theories, and to reach tentative
conclusions as to why PBRs might have real world consequences.
II. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PARTISAN BALANCE REQUIREMENTS
This Part presents our empirical analysis of the effect of partisan balance
requirements on the ideological composition of multimember agencies. Section II.A
describes our data and explains our research design. Section II.B presents initial
results. Section II.C considers supply-side and demand-side explanations for the
efficacy of PBRs.
A. Data & Research Design

See Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminates Most Filibusters on
Nominees, Wash. Post (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-tolimit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe852b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html.
81
See Mark Zdechlik, Franken Brings 60th Vote to Senate Dems, Minn. Pub. Radio (July 1, 2009),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2009/07/01/franken60.
82
See Michael Cooper, G.O.P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats, N.Y. Times (Jan. 19, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/us/politics/20election.html.
80
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To explore the relationship between the partisan and ideological outlooks of
appointees to agencies with partisan balance requirements (PBR agencies), we first
must define the population of PBR agencies. Then, we must identify both the
partisan identification and ideological orientation for each appointee to these PBR
agencies. This section details our process for collecting data on (1) PBR agencies,
(2) appointee partisanship, and (3) appointee ideology.
1. Agencies with Partisan Balance Requirements
PBR agencies share one essential attribute: a restriction, grounded in statute
or deeply entrenched norm, on the number of individuals from the same political
party that may be appointed to the agency’s multi-member governing board. We
examined appointments to 23 agencies83 that meet this definition and that were in
existence during the entire 1979-2014 period.84
With the exception of the NLRB, these agencies’ party balance requirements
are imposed by statute.85 (We classify the NLRB as a PBR agency based on a firmly
entrenched norm favoring partisan balance on that body. 86) The structural features of
these agencies vary considerably. Table 1 reports the presence or absence of design
features in these agencies that, along with PBR, are commonly considered to be
indicia of agency independence.87
83

These 23 PBR agencies are: the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC), Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im), Farm Credit
Administration (FCA), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), Federal Election Commission (FEC), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA), National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), National Mediation Board
(NMB), National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Surface
Transportation Board (STB, formerly the Interstate Commerce Commission), 83 and U.S. International
Trade Commission (USITC).
84
See George A. Krause & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Replication Data for: Experiential Learning and
Presidential Management of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy: Logic and Evidence from Agency
Leadership Appointees, 60 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 914 (2016) [hereinafter Krause & O’Connell, Replication
Data],
available
at
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/E9UQ0S (last visited
July 3, 2017); Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 784 & n.89; David C. Nixon, The Independent
Regulatory
Commissioner
Data
Base
(2005),
available
at
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~dnixon/IRC/index.htm (last visited July 3, 2017).
85
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-4(a) (mandating that the EEOC “be composed of five members, not
more than three of whom shall be members of the same political party”).
86
See infra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
87
See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89
Texas L. Rev. 15, 18 (2010); Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 784 & n.89 (2013). An agency’s
multimember structure is another common feature of independent agencies. See Barkow, supra, at 17;
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For-cause removal protection prevents the President from removing an
appointee at will, requiring that the President show cause to do so before the
expiration of the appointee’s term.88 For instance, FTC commissioners may only be
removed “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”89 Fixed terms
in office further insulate appointees to PBR agencies from the White House, and thus
provide a second indicium of agency independence.90 The ability to pursue litigation
independent of the Justice Department (“Litigation Authority”); bypass centralized
OMB review and submit budgets directly to Congress (“Bypass Authority”); and
craft policy through formal adjudication, which is less susceptible to political
interference than rulemaking (“Adjudication Authority”), all foster agency
independence as well.91 Finally, qualification requirements—e.g., that members of
the National Transportation Safety Board possess transportation-safety-related
professional credentials and experience92—constrain the President’s hand in
appointments.93

Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 792-97. Because all PBR agencies by definition are headed by
multiple members, Table 1 omits this feature.
Among these 23 agencies, the NMB is an outlier in two respects. First, its power to bind
outside parties is limited. The NMB can compel railroads or airlines and their employees to arbitrate
labor disputes if certain conditions are met; if one party refuses to arbitrate, the NMB can authorize a
labor strike or a lockout by management. 45 U.S.C. § 155. Second, its structure includes only three
indicia of independence: fixed terms, PBRs and multi-member boards. Nonetheless, we think the
NMB deserves inclusion. Given the historical significance of labor disputes in the railroad industry
and the importance of the transportation sector to the national economy, the NMB’s powers, though
limited, are nontrivial. See Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulations 1 (2014). Further, fixed terms
and PBRs—both of which the NMB has—are considered particularly important indicia of
independence. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 188 Duke L.J.
257, 259 (1988). Nonetheless, excluding the NMB from our analysis does not materially change the
results.
88
See Barkow, supra note 87, at 27.
89
42 U.S.C. § 5841(e) (2006); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627-32 (1935).
Neither Congress nor the Courts has defined these broad terms constituting good cause, however, see
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 729 (1986), which raises the possibility that removal protections
would not constrain a motivated President. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President
and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 110-11 (1994).
90
See Peter L. Strauss, An Introduction to Administrative Justice in the United States 15 (1989).
91
Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 799--804 (regarding litigation authority); id. at 804--08 (bypass
authority); id. at 808--12 (adjudication authority).
92
49 U.S.C. § 1111(b).
93
See William G. Howell & David E. Lewis, Agencies by Presidential Design, 64 J. Pol. 1095, 1098-99 (2002). We exclude U.S. citizenship requirements, which impose de minimis constraints on
appointments, from our classification of qualification requirements.
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●
●
●
●

●
●
●

●

●
●

●
●
●
●
●
●

●
●
●

●
●
●
●
●
●
●

●
●
●
●

●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

●
●
●

●
●
●
●
●
●

As Table 1 shows, these agencies vary considerably in terms of their
particular mix of most of the other indicia of independence – except for the fact that
all PBR agencies also feature statutorily mandated fixed terms for their
commissioners or board members. That feature is remarkably common; among all
executive agencies that are typically classified as independent, only four relatively
minor agencies do not require set terms for their leaders.95
94

See Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 786 (identifying agencies with statutory removal protection);
id. at 790 (fixed terms); id. at 800 (litigation authority); id. at 804 (bypass authority); id. at 809
(adjudication authority); Henry B. Hogue, Statutory Qualifications for Executive Branch Positions,
CRS Rep. for Congress (Sept. 9, 2015), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33886.pdf (last
visited July 3, 2017) (required qualifications).
95
Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 790 (listing the Panama Canal Commission, Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation, U.S. Trade & Development Agency, and U.S. Agency for International
Development as the only independent agencies without specified tenure for appointees).
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2. Appointee Party Identification
Having identified the set of PBR agencies for this study, we turn to
determining the partisan affiliations of appointees to these agencies. For 11 agencies
(the CPSC, EEOC, FCC, FEC, FERC, FTC, NLRB, NTSB, NRC, SEC, and STB),
we obtained, from an executive-appointee biographical dataset compiled by George
Krause and Anne Joseph O’Connell, the name, date of nomination, and partisan
identification for each individual appointed between 1979 and 2008.96 We then
extended this analysis through 2014 via Congressional Research Service reports
containing the same information for appointments made between 2000 at 2014.97 To
assess the reliability of both data sources, we examined the extent to which the two
sources include identical information for appointees during the 2000-2008 period for
which the two sources overlap. Inter-observer reliability between the two data
sources is extremely high; the appointee names, nomination dates, and partisan
affiliations reported in the two sources in this period were identical.
For the other 12 agencies, we built an original dataset that includes the name,
date of nomination, and party affiliation for each individual appointed as a board
member or commissioner from 1979 through 1999. We drew information on name
and date of nomination from congressional records and determined partisan
identifications from a variety of other sources, including newspaper reports around
the time of nomination and obituaries of now-deceased appointees. Once again, we
extended this analysis through 2014 via Congressional Research Service reports.
3. Appointee Ideology

See George A. Krause & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Replication Data for: Experiential Learning and
Presidential Management of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy: Logic and Evidence from Agency
Leadership Appointees, 60 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 914 (2016) [hereinafter Krause & O’Connell, Replication
Data],
available
at
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/E9UQ0S (last visited
July 3, 2017). Krause and O’Connell’s dataset reports whether each appointee “has [the] same or
strongly presumed partisan affiliation as [the] appointing President.” See Codebook, Krause &
O’Connell,
Replication
Data,
available
at
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=2681274&version=1.2 (last visited July 3, 2017); see
also George A. Krause & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Compliance, Competence, and Bureaucratic
Leadership in the U.S. Federal Government Agencies, at 13--17 (Sept. 19, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript) (describing the database).
97
Congressional Research Service, Presidential Appointments to Full-Time Positions on Regulatory
and Other Collegial Boards and Commissions (2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015
eds.), available at https://www.everycrsreport.com (last visited July 3, 2017). We excluded from our
analysis the nine appointees whom the CRS Reports classified as “independent.”
96
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Finally, we employ the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and
Elections (DIME) to determine the ideological preferences of each appointee.98
Developed by Adam Bonica, DIME contains over 130 million political contributions
made by 14.7 million individuals and 1.7 million organizations to over 80,000
political action committees and candidates in federal, state, and local elections
between 1979 and 2014.99 DIME leverages these data to generate ideology-based
scores, referred to as Campaign Finance Scores (CFscores), for all donors and
recipients during this period.100
The intuition behind DIME is simple: that individuals’ decisions to contribute
to political campaigns constitute revealed preferences concerning their political
views.101 The destination and amount of an individual’s campaign contributions
disclose information regarding that individual’s ideological “ideal point.” DIME’s
algorithm uses this information on all of an individual’s donations between 1979 and
2014 to place donors along a scale based on their history of campaign
contributions.102 The scale ranges from -2 (assigned to the most liberal donors) to 2
98

See Adam Bonica, Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) (Aug. 16,
2016), available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/dime (last visited July 3, 2017).
99
Adam Bonica, DIME Codebook, Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME)
(Aug. 16, 2016), available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=2865308&version=2.2
(last visited July 3, 2017) (providing statistics for the most recent update to DIME). Contribution data
is derived from the Federal Election Commission and several good-government organizations. Adam
Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace, 58 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 367, 370 (2014) [hereinafter
Bonica, Ideological Marketplace].
100
The use of spatial scores to measure the preferences of political actors is well-established in
political science. See Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 99, at 368. Their application to
legal scholarship has become increasingly common in recent years. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Eric A.
Posner, Supreme Court Justices’ Loyalty to the President, 45 J. Legal Stud. 401 (2016); Nicholas
Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1904 (2012).
In particular, DIME’s CFscores have been employed or cited in a wide variety of socialscientific and legal scholarship since their debut in 2013. See, e.g., Adam Bonica, Adam Chilton, &
Maya Sen, The Political Ideologies of American Lawyers, 8 J. Legal Analysis 277 (2016); Abby K.
Wood & Douglas M. Spencer, In the Shadows of Sunlight: The Effects of Transparency on State
Political Campaigns, 15 Election L.J. 302 (2016).
101
Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 99, at 367.
102
For a technical explanation of DIME’s estimation strategic, see Bonica, Ideological Marketplace,
supra note 99. Essentially, DIME places donors along a unidimensional scale so as to minimize the
distance between donors with similar patterns of political giving. DIME then places recipients along a
unidimensional scale so as to minimize the distance between recipients with similar donor pools. That
some donors also are recipients provides a “bridge,” enabling DIME to place donors and recipients on
the same scale. Likewise, that some donors contribute to both state and federal campaigns and that
some recipients run for both state and federal office provides additional bridge observations. These
bridges enable DIME to create a single ideological scale for a massive number of individuals across
36 years of politics. See Adam Bonica & Michael J. Woodruff, A Common-Space Measure of State
Supreme Court Ideology, 31 J.L. Econ. & Org. 472, 476--77 (2015). Bonica has subjected DIME to
several tests to evaluate the validity of the measure. Concerning the measure’s external validity,
CFscores for members of Congress correlate closely with the scores assigned to these legislators by
DW-NOMINATE, a well-established method of estimating legislators ideal points based on their roll-
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(the most conservative donors).103 The mean CFscore for donors is zero and the
standard deviation is one.104
To obtain each appointee’s CFscore score, we searched the DIME project’s
dataset on appointees to federal agencies,105 as well as the project’s full database on
all contributors to federal, state, and local elections between 1979 and 2014.106 For
individuals with common names or names with multiple entries in the full database,
we cross-checked the individuals’ profession, employer, and place of residence as
reported in DIME with the appointee’s biographical information available via online
sources – e.g., biographical sketches on current employers’ websites, LinkedIn
profiles, obituaries, etc. – to determine whether the individual located in DIME and
the appointee are the same person. This method yielded CFscores for 80% of
appointees to the 23 PBR agencies whom we identified (578 of 722). This 80%
match rate is comparable to the success rates of similar studies that employ DIME to
determine the ideologies of members of other elite groups.107
Readers may wonder whether campaign contributions truly capture donors’
political preferences. Donors may instead choose to give for a range of strategic
reasons—e.g., to encourage the election of politicians sympathetic to the donors’
business interests, or to curry favor with existing officeholders in exchange for
access, votes, or other services.108 This critique may seem particularly powerful for
our research design, given that all donors in our sample actually did receive
call voting records. See Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 99, at 370--71 (reporting that r =
0.92 for the bivariate correlation between these two estimates). Concerning internal validity, for
individuals that are active donors or recipients throughout the 1979-2014 period, these individuals’
static CFscores derived from their activity during the entire period are closely correlated with
CFscores derived from these individuals’ activity during select years within this range. See id.
(reporting that r = 0.97 for the bivariate correlation between these two estimates).
103
Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 99.
104
Id.
105
Adam Bonica, Executive Appointees to Federal Agencies, Database on Ideology, Money in
Politics,
and
Elections
(DIME),
available
at
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/O5PX0B (last visited
July 3, 2017); see also Adam Bonica, Jowei Chen, and Tim Johnson, Senate Gate-Keeping,
Presidential Staffing of “inferior Offices,” and the Ideological Composition of Appointments to the
Public Bureaucracy, 10 Q.J. Pol. Sci. 5 (2015).
106
Adam Bonica, DIME Contributors, 1979-2014, Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and
Elections (DIME), available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=2865300&version=2.2
(last visited July 3, 2017).
107
See Adam Bonica, Adam S. Chilton, Jacob Goldin, Kyle Rozema, & Maya Sen, The Political
Ideologies of Law Clerks, 19 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 96, 105 (2017) (reporting a 66% match rate for
former Supreme Court clerks); Bonica, Chen & Johnson, supra note 107, at 20 (72% match rate for a
subset of appointees under Clinton and George W. Bush); Adam Bonica, Avenues of Influence: On
the Political Expenditures of Corporations and their Directors and Executives, 18 Bus. & Pol. 367,
375 (2016) (83% match rate for Fortune 500 CEOs and board members).
108
See Sanford C. Gordon, Catherine Hafer, and Dimitri Landa, Consumption or Investment? On
Motivations for Political Giving, 69 J. Pol. 1057, 1058 (2007) (describing donors’ varied potential
motives).
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something of value—an executive appointment—at some point during the 36-year
period in which they made at least one campaign contribution. Our response to this
concern is twofold. First, we rely on a large body of political science research
finding that individuals make political contributions sincerely—not strategically.109
Survey results indicate that donors consider the recipient’s ideology to be the most
important factor when deciding whether to give, placing ideology far above more
strategic considerations such as electability, incumbent status, and ability to
influence the candidate.110 Accordingly, the dominant view among political scientists
considers campaign contributions as a form of consumption among “political
hobbyists,” rather than an investment by strategic actors.111 Second, insofar as a
divergence between donors’ ideological preferences and the ideal points reflected by
their campaign contributions introduces measurement error into our analysis, we find
it hard to explain why such a divergence would account for the change over time that
we document in the next Section. (Below we consider whether the easy observability
of campaign contributions in the Internet age might affect our results, and we find
strong evidence that it does not.112)
B. Results
1. Descriptive Statistics
With these data on appointee ideology and partisan identification in hand, we
turn to analyzing the effects of PBRs on the composition of agency leadership ranks.
Table 2 provides an overview of the appointees included in our data: 578 appointees
to 23 agencies over 36 years.

109

See, e.g., Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, at 370; Michael J. Ensley, Individual Campaign
Contributions and Candidate Ideology, 138 Pub. Choice 221 (2009); Nolan McCarty & Lawrence S.
Rothenberg, Commitment and the Campaign Contribution Contract, 40 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 872 (1996).
110
See Michael Barber, Donation Motivations: Testing Theories of Access and Ideology, 69 Pol.
Research Q. 148, 154 & tbl.1 (2016).
111
See Eitan Hersh, Political Hobbyism: A Theory of Mass Politics, (Mar. 17, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://www.eitanhersh.com/uploads/7/9/7/5/7975685/hersh_theory_of_hobbyism_v2.0.pdf
(last
visited July 3, 2017); accord Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo, & James M. Snyder,
Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. Econ. Perspectives 105 (2003).
112
See infra notes 163-165 and accompanying text.
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Table 2: Coverage: Appointees by President
Appointing
President

Co-Party
Appointees

Cross-Party Appointees

Total
Appts.

Appts.
Per Year

Total
Appts.

Appts. Per
Year

All
(1979-2014)

362

6.6

216

4.0

Democratic
Presidents

155

5.9

96

3.8

Republican
Presidents

207

7.2

120

4.3

Carter

11

5.5

9

4.5

Reagan

56

7.0

38

4.8

G.H.W. Bush

39

9.75

17

4.3

Clinton

75

9.4

48

6.0

G.W. Bush

112

14.0

65

8.2

Obama

69

11.5

39

6.5

n = 578. Includes appointees to 23 agencies during the 19792014 period. Carter years include 1979-1980 only; Obama years
include 2009-2014 only.
Unsurprisingly, all Presidents during this period tended to appoint their
fellow party members to PBR agencies; 362 of the 578, or 63 percent, of appointees
belonged to the same party as the appointing President.113 This tilt is not the result of
Presidents disregarding PBR statutes.114 Instead, it is possible because most partisan
balance statutes do not require perfect balance, and instead permit a bare majority of
Interestingly, the proportion of appointees that share the President’s party label almost perfectly
mirrors the no-more-than-three-of-five requirement that is typical among independent agencies. See
Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 776.
114
The imbalance is greatest during the presidency of George H.W. Bush, who is not known for his
sharp partisan elbows. See Jon Meacham, Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George
Herbert Walker Bush 390 (2015).
113
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members to be affiliated with the same political party.115 The possibility that copartisan appointees strategically retire before the end of their terms when a friendly
President is in office (leading to more openings for co-party slots during any given
presidency) also may contribute to the imbalance.116 Table 3 contains descriptive
statistics concerning the ideologies of appointees to PBR agencies, arranged by
President and by whether the appointee and appointing President shared a partisan
affiliation. For each President, Table 3 also reports differences in the mean ideology
of co-party versus cross-party appointees.117

115

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 2053(c) (mandating that no than three out of the five CPSC commissioners be
affiliated with the same party); 15 U.S.C. 78d(a) (same requirement for the SEC); but see, e.g., 52
U.S.C. 30106(a)(1) (requiring exact partisan balance on the FEC).
116
Cf. Lee Epstein and Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial Appointments
37 (2005) (summarizing studies showing that appellate judges strategically time their retirements to
increase the likelihood that likeminded successors will replace them).
Note that the number of appointees per year who appear in DIME is somewhat lower for the
Carter and Reagan administrations than for later presidencies. We attribute this trend to three factors.
First, public disclosure of federal campaign contributions did not begin until 1972, and DIME’s
coverage starts in 1979. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 304, 86
Stat. 3, 14-15 (1972) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30104). Thus, Carter and Reagan
appointees who made their last campaign contributions before the late 1970s will generally not appear
in DIME. Second, the $200 reporting threshold has not changed since 1980, despite intervening
inflation. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, § 103, 93 Stat. 1339, 1352
(1980) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30104). Individuals who made campaign contributions in
more recent years thus are more likely to exceed the threshold and trigger a public disclosure. Finally,
one agency was established partway through the 1979-2014 period, resulting in a small increase in the
number of positions to be filled. See National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L.
No. 100–456, § 1441(a), 102 Stat. 1918, 2076 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2286)
(establishing Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board). Excluding the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board from the analysis does not materially alter any of our results.
117
The final column in Table 3 reports the p value for a series of two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(KS) tests for differences in distributions. Low p values counsel in favor of rejecting the null
hypothesis that the distribution of CFscores for co-party appointees and the distribution of CFscores
for cross-party appointees were drawn from the same underlying distribution. All of the reported p
values meet – and, for all but the Carter appointees, far exceed – the conventionally accepted p < 0.05
threshold for statistical significance.
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Table 3: Appointee Ideology, by President
Appointing
President

Mean CFscore
(Standard Deviation)
Co-Party
Cross-Party
Appointees
Appointees

| Diff. in Means | 118
(95% Conf. Interval)

KS Test pvalue

Democratic
Presidents

-0.913
(0.521)

0.774
(0.535)

1.687
(1.549, 1.826)

0.000

Republican
Presidents

0. 848
(0.368)

-0.492
(0.808)

1.340
(1.182, 1.497)

0.000

Carter

-0.494
(0.749)

0.301
(0.828)

0.795
(0.011, 1.601)

0.047

Reagan

0.797
(0.539)

-0.005
(0.794)

0.802
(0.496, 1.108)

0.000

G.H.W. Bush

0.846
(0.422)

-0.162
(0.900)

1.008
(0.497, 1.520)

0.000

Clinton

-0.875
(0.408)

0.747
(0.494)

1.622
(1.447, 1.798)

0.000

G.W. Bush

0.873
(0.213)

-0.830
(0.615)

1.703
(1.546, 1.861)

0.000

Obama

-1.015
(0.563)

0.902
(0.458)

1.917
(1.719, 2.116)

0.000

n = 578. Includes appointees to 23 agencies during the 1979-2014 period. Absolute values of
differences in means between co-party and cross-party appointees reported. Differences in
means calculated via Welch’s t-tests, appropriate for samples with skewed distributions
drawn from independent populations. Carter years include 1979-1980 only; Obama years
include 2009-2014 only. During the entire 1979-2014 period, the mean CFscore for all
appointees was 0.078 (sd=0.961).

The key takeaway from Table 3 emerges from the column displaying the
difference in means between co-party and cross-party appointees. During the Carter
administration, the point estimate for the ideological gap between co-party and crossparty appointees to PBR agencies is 0.795, which indicates a modest ideological
118

Difference in means refers to the absolute value of the difference in mean CFscore for co-party
appointees and mean CFscore for cross-party appointees.
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difference (less than one standard deviation) between Carter’s co-party and crossparty appointees.119 This gap grows steadily in subsequent administrations, reaching
1.917 in the Obama years—almost two-and-one-half times the size of the gap under
Carter. The widening occurs over Democratic as well as Republican administrations.
Accordingly, at first glance the most notable aspect of this difference is its growth
over time, rather than its association with any particular party or presidency.
2. Co-Party vs. Cross-Party Appointees
What do the ideologies of appointees to PBR agencies look like? More
specifically, how do the views of individuals appointed to Democratic seats by
Democratic President differ from those appointed to Democratic seats by Republican
Presidents? And are the patterns similar for Republican appointees?
To answer these questions, Figure 3 compares the ideological distributions of
all four categories of nominees. Democratic officials appointed by Democratic
Presidents appear in dark blue, whereas Democrats appointed by Republicans appear
in light blue; likewise, Republicans appointed by Republicans appear in dark red,
whereas Republicans appointed by Democrats appear in light red. Because, for this
analysis, we are interested in recent appointment behavior, the figure is limited to the
2000-2014 period.

119

See Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 99 (stating that the mean CFscore for donors is
zero and the standard deviation is one).
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Figure 3: Ideologies of Appointees to PBR Agencies, 2000-2014

n = 347. Includes appointees made during the 2000-2014 period to 23 PBR
agencies.

Figure 3 reveals a striking feature of recent appointments to PBR agencies: in
expectation, Democrats appointed by Democratic Presidents have views virtually
identical to those of Democrats appointed by Republican Presidents, and the same
holds true of Republican appointees. Presidents Clinton and Obama did not name
liberal Republicans to cross-party positions on PBR agencies; neither did President
George W. Bush appoint conservative Democrats to cross-party seats. Instead, recent
Presidents abided by the spirit of PBRs in agencies’ organic statutes.
Presidents’ willingness to appoint their ideological opponents to cross-party
seats appears to be a recent development. The following several figures compare the
ideologies of co-party and cross-party appointees beginning in 1979.Figure 4(a)
displays the ideological distance between the CFscore of the appointing President
and the mean CFscore of that President’s appointees to PBR agencies. For a
Democratic President, a negative value indicates that the mean appointee is more
liberal than the appointing President, and a positive value indicates that the mean
appointee is more conservative. For a Republican President, the reverse is the case:
negative values indicate that the mean appointee is more conservative than the
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appointing President, and positive values indicate that the appointee is more liberal.
Figure 4(b) reports similar information by year. The bars emanating from the point
estimates in both figures denote one standard deviation in each direction from the
relevant mean.
Figure 4(a): Ideological Distance Between Appointees to PBR Agencies
and Their Appointing Presidents

n = 578. Point estimates, denoted as solid shapes, signify mean distance between
appointees’ CFscore and appointing President’s CFscore. Positive values for appointees in a
Democratic (Republican) administration signify that the mean appointee is more
conservative (liberal) than the appointing President. Vertical bars extend one standard
deviation above and below the mean. The appointing President’s CFscore is standardized to
y = 0. Carter years include 1979-1980 only; Obama years include 2009-2014 only.
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Figure 4(b): Ideological Distance Between Appointees to PBR Agencies
and Their Appointing Presidents, by Year

n = 578. Point estimates, denoted as solid shapes, signify mean distance between
appointees’ CFscore and appointing President’s CFscore. Positive values for appointees in a
Democratic (Republican) administration signify that the mean appointee is more
conservative (liberal) than the appointing President. Vertical bars extend one standard
deviation above and below the mean. The appointing President’s CFscore is standardized to
y = 0.

The point estimates for Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show that cross-party
appointees are more conservative than co-party appointees across all Democratic
administrations and more liberal than co-party appointees in all Republican
administrations. This gap increases, in fits and spurts, throughout the period of study.
During the Carter administration, for instance, the CFscore for the mean appointee to
a Democratic seat was 0.159 points to the left of President Carter’s CFscore, whereas
the mean appointee to a Republican seat had a CFscore that was 0.636 points to the
right of President Carter—a gap of 0.795 points. By the Obama administration, the
mean Democratic appointee was 0.637 points to the right of President Obama, while
the mean Republican appointee was 2.471 points to the right of the President—a gap
of 1.834 points. In other words, the ideological gap between co-party and cross-party
appointees within the same administration widened over time.
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The associated standard deviations in both figures provide further support
this finding. In Figure 4(a), the standard deviation bars for co-party and cross-party
appointees overlap during the Carter, Reagan and George H.W. Bush
administrations, indicating that a sizable number of co-party and cross-party
appointees are ideologically similar. The bars then pull apart in the Clinton, George
W. Bush, and Obama years, signifying significantly less ideological overlap between
co-party and cross-party appointees during these presidencies. The standard
deviation bars in Figure 4(b) tell a similar story.

A time trend appears to be present in Figures 4(a) and 4(b), with the
ideological distance between cross-party appointees and their appointing President
increasing over time. Figure 5, below, provides a better sense of this time trend. The
figure plots the difference in ideological score between the President and cross-party
appointees over the 36-year study period and includes a linear regression line. The
positive slope suggests the presence of a trend component.
Figure 5: Time Trend in Ideological Distance Between the President and Cross-Party
Appointees

The supply-side theory suggests that we should observe steady growth in the
ideological gap between cross-party appointees and their appointing President over
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time, consistent with the pattern of partisan sort shown in Figure 2. By contrast, the
supply-side theory gives us no reason to expect any similar changes over time in the
gap between co-party appointees and their appointing President. None of the six
Presidents in our study period (Carter through Obama) exhibited ideological
preferences that were radically out of step with the mainstream of his own party, and
so we would expect each of these Presidents to be able to find co-partisans whose
views roughly matched his own. Visually, Figures 4 and 5 align with the supply-side
theory’s predictions: cross-party appointees have grown further apart from the
appointing President, while co-party appointees have not.
3. Ideological Consistency
Our analysis thus far treats appointees’ ideologies as time-invariant. The
DIME master database assigns each donor a single CFscore based on that
individual’s total contributions during the 1979-2014 period, and we adopt this
measure as a proxy for ideology in the analysis above. Yet we are mindful that
individuals may evolve in their thinking, or that they may donate strategically prior
to their appointment so as to send a signal of ideology that differs from their true
preferences. Fortunately, the available data allow us to observe whether donation
patterns change post-appointment in ways that would suggest either ideological drift
or strategic giving.
Although ideological self-categorization is stable for most people throughout
their lives,120 members of the political class from which appointees are drawn may
be less consistent. The notion that elite actors display ideological fluidity over their
careers is familiar to students of judicial behavior. Observers of the Supreme Court
have pointed to a so-called “Greenhouse effect”—a trend of Supreme Court Justices
“drift[ing] away from the conservatism of their early votes” and towards the more
liberal preferences of “cultural elites.”121 While the Greenhouse effect generally
refers to the evolution of appointees’ sincere preferences over time, a related
possibility is that prospective appointees may misrepresent their preferences prior to

120

Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist, & Eric Schickler, Partisan Hearts & Minds 28 (2004).
See Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the
American People, 98 Geo. L.J. 1515, 1518 (2010). The “Greenhouse” in question is Linda
Greenhouse, the longtime Supreme Court correspondent for the New York Times. The term can be
traced back to a 1992 speech by Judge Laurence Silberman, a Reagan appointee to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, who claimed that Greenhouse’s reporting pressured Justices to take
more liberal stances in order to garner favorable coverage from the Times. See Martin Tolchin, Press
Is Condemned by a Federal Judge for Court Coverage, N.Y. Times (June 15, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/15/us/press-is-condemned-by-a-federal-judge-for-courtcoverage.html.
121
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confirmation and then reveal their true selves after they are sworn in.122 For example,
a Democratic President may “sell” a nominee to the Senate as a genuine Republican,
but the individual may turn out to be—after confirmation—a liberal who registered
as a Republican and donated to conservative candidates for the purpose of
positioning himself for a potential cross-party appointment. To return to our market
metaphor, a potential appointee who looks like a peach from the opposition party’s
perspective may turn out to be a lemon—and consumers (here, senators) have
incomplete information regarding which nominees fall into which of these categories
until after the transaction.
To test the ideological consistency of appointees over time, we examined the
donation patterns of commissioners in the eight years before and after their initial
appointment. We looked at commissioners’ cycle-specific scores derived from the
biennial DIME contribution datasets, which include CFscores for donors in each
two-year election cycle.123 Naturally, these files are less comprehensive than the
1979-2014 DIME master database; to be included in one of the election cyclespecific files, an individual must donate to a sufficient number of candidates or
PACs to generate a CFscore for that cycle.
Creating cycle-specific scores enables us to chart commissioners’ ideal point
estimates over time and identify any changes in behavior around the time of their
initial appointments. Here, we display results for the FCC, which in several respects
is the archetypical agency with a PBR; the FCC has the modal number of
commissioners (five), the modal term length (five years), and, like many of the 23
agencies in our study, was created during the New Deal era.
Figure 6 displays our results for both Democratic and Republican appointees
selected by both Democratic and Republican presidents. To compare commissioners’
ideal point estimates before and after appointment, the x axis in both figures denotes
the number of years since each commissioner was first appointed to the FCC
(negative numbers thus represent pre-appointment years).

On “stealth nominees” at the Supreme Court, see Michael Comiskey, The Supreme Court
Appointment Process: Lessons from Filling the Rehnquist and O’Connor Vacancies, 41 PS: Pol. Sci.
& Pol. 355, 357 (2008).
123
We thank Adam Bonica and Kyle Rozema for their assistance in this analysis.
122
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Figure 6: Longitudinal Change in FCC Commissioners’ Ideal Point Estimates

If liberals registered as Republicans and donated to conservative candidates
so that they could be sold by a Democratic President to Senate Republicans as
genuine cross-party appointees, then we would expect to see the light red line
(Democratic President, Republican appointee) trending downwards in later years, as
appointees who posed as conservatives pre-confirmation revealed their true liberal
selves. Likewise, if conservatives registered as Democrats and donated to liberal
candidates so that they could be sold by a Republican President to Senate Democrats,
then we would expect to see the light blue line (Republican President, Democratic
appointee) trending upwards in later years, as appointees who posted as liberals
revealed their true conservative selves. And if appointees tended to drift in a single
direction (i.e., a Greenhouse effect at multimember agencies), then we would expect
the lines to be roughly parallel with similar slopes.
We observe none of these phenomena in Figure 6. For the most part,
commissioners display consistent ideologies over time. Concerning those
commissioners for whom we have ideal point estimates both before and after their
initial appointments, we see only slight, inconsistent movement towards more
extreme positions post-appointment.
4. PBR Agencies vs. the Rest of the Executive Branch
To provide broader context for this secular divergence in the ideological
composition of PBR agencies, we compare ideological preferences of appointees to
PBR agencies with the ideological preferences of other high-level executive branch
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policymakers.124 Placing PBR agency appointees and other officeholders on the
same scale allows us to assess the extent to which the observed trend in PBR
agencies reflects or departs from changes in the ideological composition of executive
appointees writ large.
For this analysis, we leverage a dataset created by Adam Bonica, Jowei Chen,
and Tim Johnson, which contains DIME-based CFscores scores for all available
executive appointees between the Reagan and Obama administrations.125 The solid
curves in Figures 7(a)-(f) depict the ideological distributions of PBR appointees
across five Presidential administrations; the dashed curves depict these distributions
for
other
high-level,
Senate-confirmed
officials.

124

High-level officials encompass heads and commissioners of other independent agencies,
department secretaries, and second- and third-level leaders (typically deputy secretaries and assistant
secretaries or undersecretaries) in executive departments. All positions require Senate confirmation.
125
Adam Bonica, Executive Appointees to Federal Agencies, Database on Ideology, Money in
Politics,
and
Elections
(DIME)
(Aug.
16,
2016),
available
at
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/O5PX0B (last visited
July 3, 2017); see also Adam Bonica, Jowei Chen, & Tim Johnson, supra note 107, at 5 (2015). To
allow for longitudinal comparisons across the entire period, we exclude agencies that operated during
only part of this period, e.g., the African Development Foundation, Corporation for National and
Community Service, Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, and U.S. Information Agency.
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Total observations: 2,318.
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Figures 7(a) through 7(e) show a remarkable development. Figure 7(a)
reports that during the Reagan administration, the ideological distribution of
appointees to PBR agencies—including both co-party and cross-party appointees—
maps closely onto the ideological distribution of high-level executive appointees.
Both distributions are unimodal, clustered around a conservative President’s own
CFscore. Figure 7(b) provides a similar picture for the George H.W. Bush
administration.
A change, however, is discernible in the Clinton years. Although most
Clinton appointees to both PBR agencies and other high-level executive positions are
clustered around the same left-of-center mode, a right-of-center local maximum has
begun to develop—but only for appointees to PBR agencies. This bimodality
becomes more pronounced in the George W. Bush administration (naturally, with the
locations of the global and local maxima flipping, as the White House switches from
Democratic to Republican control). The trend continues in the Obama
administration; by the Obama years, the distribution of appointees to PBR agencies
is almost completely bimodal, with a cluster of appointees located approximately at 1 and a second cluster – only slightly smaller – roughly centered around +1. By
contrast, the distribution of other high-level appointees remains single-peaked, with
its mode located near the President’s CFscore.
To translate these trends from picture to prose: Our findings suggest that
PBRs had very little effect on the ideological composition of agencies during the
Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. The ideological distribution of PBR
agency appointees closely matches the distribution of appointees to positions not
covered by PBRs. Starting with the Clinton administration, however, we begin to see
a distinct PBR effect. President Clinton appointed a fair number of conservatives to
PBR agencies but named very few conservatives to other posts. The PBR effect
grows even more pronounced under President George W. Bush and President
Obama. These results confirm our thesis that PBRs do indeed bite, but that they have
come to bite only relatively recently.
5. Statutory vs. Informal PBRs
Our analysis thus far has lumped the National Labor Relations Board with
other PBR agencies, even though the National Labor Relations Board is not subject
to a formal PBR. The House in 1947 passed legislation that would have added a
formal partisan balance requirement to the statute governing NLRB membership, but
the party balance provision was (for reasons not explained in the legislative
history126) omitted from the version of the bill that passed the Senate and became
law.127 Nonetheless, there has been a “tradition” since the Eisenhower years that
126

H.R Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 36--37 (1947) (noting that party balance provision was
included in House bill but not in conference agreement, and offering no explanation for omission).
127
See Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 139 (1947).
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Presidents have filled no more than three of the NLRB’s five seats with members of
their own party.128 The informal partisan balance requirement at the NLRB is an
example of what Adrian Vermeuele has called a “convention of agency
independence”: an unwritten norm that has come to govern the behavior of political
actors with respect to the agency.129
The case of the NLRB allows us to examine whether a partisan balance
requirement that emerges from convention has the same effect on ideological
composition as a PBR set forth by statute. Table 4 compares the ideologies of
appointees to the NLRB and the 22 agencies with statutory PBRs for which we have
obtained data covering the 1979-2014 period. Under Democratic Presidents, crossparty appointees to the NLRB appear, on average, to be slightly less conservative
than cross-party appointees to agencies with statutory partisan balance requirements,
but this difference falls far short of statistical significance (p = 0.945). Likewise,
under Republican Presidents, cross-party appointees to the NLRB appear on average
to be slightly less liberal than cross-party appointees to agencies with statutory
PBRs, but again, this difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.849). In short,
we find little to suggest that the difference between the NLRB’s partisan balance
convention and the statutory PBRs applicable to other agencies has any effect on
ideological composition—the NLRB looks much like the statutory PBR agencies in
terms of the ideological preferences of appointees.
Table 4: Mean Ideology of Appointees to NLRB and Statutory PBR Agencies
NLRB

Statutory PBR Agencies

Co-Party
Appointees

Cross Party
Appointees

Co-Party
Appointees

Cross Party
Appointees

Democratic
Presidents

-1.106
(0.309)

0.753
(0.774)

-0.898
(0.531)

0.776
(0.520)

Republican
Presidents

0.681
(0.760)

-0.341
(1.052)

0.863
(0.309)

-0.500
(0.797)

n = 578. Includes appointments made to the NLRB and 22 other agencies during
the 1979-2014 period. Cells report mean CFscores and, in parentheses, standard
deviations.
128

Matthew M. Bodah, Congress and the National Labor Relations Board: A Review of the Recent
Past, 22 J. Labor Res. 699, 700 (2001); James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s
Uncertain Future, 26 Comp. Labor Law & Pol’y J. 221, 244 & n. 109 (2005). The last time that the
NLRB had more than three members from the same party was August 1956, when four Republicans
and one Democrat served on the board. President Eisenhower then named a Democrat to replace a
retiring Republican. See Members of the NLRB Since 1935, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd.,
https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/members-nlrb-1935 (last visited July 16, 2017).
129
See Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1163 (2013).
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Indeed, when we focus on 21st century appointments, we find evidence that
the partisan balance convention at the NLRB has as much if not more “bite” than
statutory PBRs elsewhere. Since 2000, Republicans appointed by Democratic
Presidents to the NLRB have been, on average, even more conservative—and
Democrats appointed by Republican Presidents to the NLRB even more liberal—
than those Presidents’ cross-party appointees to agencies with statutory PBRs.130
This conclusion, however, comes with an important caveat. Our dataset includes
CFscores for only six cross-party appointees—three Democrats appointed by
President George W. Bush and three Republicans appointed by President Clinton or
Obama—during the 2000-2014 period. This relative lack of data on cross-party
appointees to the NLRB may not be coincidental. The Board has suffered from
persistent, politically motivated vacancies during the past several administrations.131
Whereas Congress permits appointees to other agencies to serve beyond the
expiration of their terms until their successors are confirmed,132 NLRB members are
not authorized to serve in an acting capacity.133 That NLRB seats remain vacant until
filled may provide senators with an additional incentive to delay acting on
nominations to the Board (beyond their usual incentives to do so for agencies where
such delay leaves the existing appointees temporarily in place). Accordingly, it is
possible that partisan gamesmanship is occurring with respect to cross-party
appointees to the NLRB—it just occurs at an earlier stage in the appointments
process and thus is not captured by the CFscores for those individuals that make it
onto the Board.
In sum, the partisan balance norm that exists by “convention” or “tradition”
at the NLRB appears to be driving a gap between co-party and cross-party
appointees that is broadly similar to the gap between co-party and cross-party
appointees at agencies with statutory PBRs. The bite of partisan balance
130

Further, the results when the analysis is limited to 2000-2014 also lend support to the conventional
wisdom that the NLRB is an unusually politicized agency. See Brudney, supra note 128, at 223--24;
Samuel Estreicher, ‘Depoliticizing’ the National Labor Relations Board: Administrative Steps, 64
Emory L.J. 1611, 1613 (2015); Julius G. Getman, The NLRB: What Went Wrong and Should We Try
To Fix It?, 64 Emory L.J. 1495, 1496 (2015). For each President/appointee combination, the mean
NLRB appointee is more extreme than the corresponding cell in the table for the other agencies with
PBRs.
131
See Mark Landler and Steven Greenhouse, Vacancies and Partisan Fighting Put Labor Relations
Agency in Legal Limbo, N.Y. Times (July 15, 2013).
132
See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(A) (providing that CFTC commissioners “shall hold office for a term
of five years and until his successor is appointed and has qualified, except that he shall not so continue
to serve beyond the expiration of the next session of Congress subsequent to the expiration of said
fixed term of office”); 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (similar provision regarding the SEC); 42 U.S.C. §
7171(b)(1) (FERC); 47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (FCC).
133
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3349b, 3349c(1)(A) (appointees to multi-member independent agencies cannot
serve in a holdover or acting position unless otherwise statutorily authorized); 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (no
provision in NLRB organic statute for continuation of service beyond length of fixed term).
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requirements does not appear to depend on whether these provisions are written into
law. But whether we are dealing with a statutory PBR or a PBR that arises from
convention, the puzzle remains as to why these requirements do anything at all to
shape the ideological composition of multimember agencies. The next section turns
to that question and to the implications of our results for various theories of PBRs’
efficacy.
C. Market Forces and Appointee Selection
This Section reevaluates our two main causal explanations for the efficacy of
PBRs—the supply-side theory and the demand-side theory—in light of our empirical
analysis. We also consider (and largely reject) alternative hypotheses that might
account for the topline results and time trends observed above.
1. Supply-Side Constraints
Our results are broadly consistent with the supply-side theory, which holds
that Presidents are constrained in their selection by the ideological composition of
the pool of potential cross-party appointees. As the political class from which the
memberships of boards and commissions are typical drawn becomes more
ideologically polarized along party lines, it becomes increasingly difficult for a
President to identify competent individuals whose ideological preferences track the
President’s own but whose party affiliation does not. Presidents are reactive in this
narrative; they appoint bona fide cross-party members because these are the only
competent potential appointees that “the market” supplies.
The time trends in Figures 4(a) and 4(b) supports this theory. The
appointment of bona fide cross-party members gradually becomes more prevalent
from the late 1970s through the mid-2010s, while simultaneously, the political
classes gradually became more ideologically distinct along party lines. While it
might seem surprising that a motivated Democratic President cannot find a liberal
Republican for a cross-party seat or that a motivated Republican President cannot
find a conservative Democrat, the supply-side theory becomes more plausible if one
supposes that Presidents care about competence as well as ideological alignment. To
be sure, a Democratic President might still be able to find someone in a nation of
more than 300 million people who shares the President’s liberal views but registers
as an independent or a Republican, and a Republican President might still be able to
find someone who shares that President’s conservative views but registers as an
independent or a Democrat. Yet while we observe past Presidents drawing crossparty appointees from the pools of liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats
when these pools were much larger, we see relatively few cross-party appointments
of these types in recent years.
2. Demand-Side Constraints
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The demand-side theory, by contrast, finds much weaker support here. Recall
that this theory views senators as the “consumers” in the confirmation market to
whom the President must “sell” his or her favored nominees. One could imagine that
Democratic Presidents may want to appointee liberal Republicans to Republicandesignated seats and that Republican Presidents may have the inverse desire, but that
opposition-party senators use their advice-and-consent authority to block the
appointments of moderates to party-specific seats. The demand-side theory therefore
holds that the presence of bona fide cross-party commissioners on PBR agencies is
attributable to pressure from cross-party senators.
If this narrative is accurate, one would expect Presidents to appoint genuine
cross-partisans to cross-party seats only when cross-party senators are sufficiently
powerful to compel Presidents to do so. By contrast, when cross-party senators do
not have enough votes to block a party-member-in-name-only nominee, Presidents
will have free rein to appoint milquetoast partisans to cross-party seats. Essentially,
one would expect the ideological distance between appointing Presidents and crossparty appointees to be positively correlated with cross-party senators’ power to deny
confirmation to disfavored nominees.
When do cross-party senators have the power to deny confirmation? One
possibility is that the ability to block cloture—and thus deny a vote on a nominee—
provides cross-party senators with a means of ensuring that the President appoints
bona fide cross-party members to PBR agencies. This explanation, however, cannot
explain the time trend in Figures 4(a) and 4(b), i.e., that partisan balance
requirements have come to exert stronger effects over time. During virtually the
entire study period, both parties held a sufficient number of seats to block a nominee
under Senate filibuster rules.134 Yet, as Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show, cross-party
appointees did not become ideologically distinct, at conventionally accepted levels of
statistical significance, until late in the period.
Further, a recent change in Senate rules allows for a simple test of the
Senate’s potential role in giving PBRs their bite—and the results suggest that role is
limited. On November 21, 2013, the leadership of the Senate Democratic majority
134

For almost the entire 1979-2014 period, confirmation of executive-branch nominees required the
assent of 60 senators, which is the number needed to invoke cloture under Senate Rule XXII. See
Senate Rule XXII, §2 (providing that three-fifths of senators are required to invoke cloture, i.e., to
vote to limit further consideration of a pending question, thereby permitting the question to be put to a
majority vote). On November 21, 2013, the Senate re-interpreted Rule XXII to allow 51 votes to
invoke cloture for nominees to positions other than the Supreme Court. Accordingly, a unified
opposition party holding at least 41 Senate seats prior to that date, or 51 seats thereafter, could block a
nominee. See Walter Oleszek, Changing the Senate Cloture Rule at the Start of a New Congress, CRS
Rep. for Congress (Dec. 12, 2016), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44709.pdf (last visited
July 3, 2017). This new interpretation applies only if the vote occurs pursuant to a specific procedural
posture. Id. The opposition party needs 51 votes, rather than 50, to block a nominee after November
21, 2013, because, in the event of a 50-50 tie, the Vice President would vote for confirmation.
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exercised the “nuclear option” and altered the chamber’s interpretation of Senate
Rule XXII to reduce the number of votes needed to invoke cloture for nominees to
positions other than Supreme Court justiceships from 60 to 51 (or 50, with the Vice
President as a tiebreaker).135 For only the second time during the study period, a
unified cross-party (here, the Republicans) did not possess sufficient votes to prevent
a Senate majority from invoking cloture on a confirmation vote for a nominee to a
PBR agency. A Senate-focused theory of PBRs’ bite would predict that President
Obama’s appointees to cross-party seats would tend to be more liberal after
November 21, 2013. In reality, however, appointees to cross-party PBR seats in the
12 months after this date are 0.179 points more conservative than appointees to
cross-party PBR seats in the prior 12 months—a difference that is in line with the
long-term year-to-year increases in ideological distance between the President and
cross-party appointees displayed in Figure 4(b).
The other period in which a unified cross-party (again, the Republicans) did
not possess sufficient votes to block a Senate majority from invoking closure was
July 7, 2009 through February 4, 2010.136 That period was bookmarked, on one end,
by the seating of Senator Al Franken of Minnesota as the 60th Democratic senator
following a long recount, and, on the other end, by the seating of Scott Brown, a
Republican from Massachusetts, after a special election that reduced the Democratic
caucus to 59.137 During that interval, the Obama administration’s appointees to crossparty seats were 0.111 points more liberal than they had been in the period between
President Obama’s inauguration and Senator Franken’s swearing-in. This slightly
more liberal tilt in cross-party appointees during a period in which Democrats
controlled the White House and held a supermajority in the Senate hints at a
demand-side effect.
Trends following Senator Brown’s seating, however, cut against the demandside theory. Following Brown’s seating, Senate Democrats saw their filibuster-proof
supermajority end. The demand-side theory predicts that cross-party appointees
would trend conservative based on Senate Republicans’ relatively greater power in
this period. Yet in the 12 months following Brown’s seating, cross-party appointees
were 0.093 points more liberal than they were during interval in which the
Democrats held a supermajority. This slight liberal trend continued through the date
on which Senate Democratic leadership exercised the nuclear option.

135

See Walter Oleszek, Changing the Senate Cloture Rule at the Start of a New Congress, CRS Rep.
for Congress (Dec. 12, 2016), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44709.pdf (last visited July
3, 2017).
136
See Monica Davey and Carl Hulse, Franken’s Win Bolsters Democratic Grip in Senate, N.Y.
Times (June 30, 2009) (stating that Franken’s seating would give the Democrats 60 seats in the
Senate, which is sufficient to overcome a filibuster); Janet Hook, Republican Scott Brown of
Massachusetts Sworn In to Senate, L.A. Times (February 4, 2010) (stating that Brown’s seating
would reduce the Democrats’ numbers to 59, depriving them of this ability).
137
See id.
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Table 5 compares the actual trends in cross-party appointee ideology around
these demand-side pivotal moments with the effects that we might predict on the
basis of the demand-side theory. (In all intervals in the table, cross-party appointees
are Obama appointees to Republican seats.) In only one of the three intervals—
roughly what one might expect from three coin flips—does reality line up with the
predictions generated by the demand-side theory. While we cannot entirely rule out
the possibility that the opposition party’s ability to block a nomination has a modest
effect on the ideological composition of multimember agencies, the evidence from
these Obama-era shocks casts significant doubt on the demand-side story.
Table 5: Using Demand Shocks to Assess the Demand-Side Hypothesis
Intervals

Obama
Inaugurated –
Franken Seated

Franken Seated –
Brown Seated

Brown Seated –
Nuclear Option
Exercised

Nuclear Option
Exercised – End of
Democratic Majority

Demand-side theory
predicts cross-party
appointees will be …

–

more liberal than more conservative more liberal than
previous period
than
previous previous period
period

Cross-party appointees
actually were …

–

more liberal than more liberal than more
conservative
previous period
previous period
than previous period

But perhaps the demand-side mechanism is subtler than simply whether a
completely unified cross-party could prevent a floor vote. After all, senators rarely
utilize their Rule XXII prerogative for nominees to executive-branch positions.138 Of
those executive-branch nominations that are reported out of committee, only 4% die
on the floor, a figure that includes failures to pass a cloture motion to end a filibuster,
filibuster threats, and individual senators’ holds on nominations.139 By contrast,
Senate committees fail to report out approximately 20% of nominations, which
effectively ends these nominees’ chances of confirmation in most cases.140 The role
that majority-party-dominated committees play in the process suggests that a Senate
party’s influence over nominations is far broader—and, perhaps, harder to define—
than simply the binary matter of whether the party (if completely unified) possesses
41 votes to deny cloture.
To test the hypothesis that the power of the cross-party in the Senate
influences the President’s choice of moderates or ideologues for cross-party seats on
PBR agencies, we regress the ideological distance between each cross-party
138

See Bonica, Chen & Johnson, supra note 105, at 10.
Id.
140
Id.
139
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appointee and the appointing President (“CFscore Difference”141) on the crossparty’s seat share in the Senate at the time of each appointment (Model 1). As an
alternative specification, we also regress CFscore Difference on whether the crossparty held a Senate majority at the time of the appointment (Model 2); “Divided
Government” is coded as 1 if the cross-party held at least 51 Senate seats.142 Finally,
Models 3 and 4 add a time-trend variable into the mix. “Time” signifies the number
of years since the inception of the series in 1979 that a given cross-party appointee
was confirmed. Including both “Time” and either “Cross-Party Seat Share” or
“Divided Government” in these final two models, enables us to pit the supply-side
and demand-side hypotheses directly against each other.
Table 6: Senate Composition and Cross-Appointee Selection
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-0.036
(0.027)

—

-0.027**
(0.009)

—

Divided Government

—

-0.294
(0.227)

—

-0.202*
(0.100)

Time (Years Since 1979)

—

—

0.043***
(0.006)

0.044***
(0.005)

Cross-Party Seat Share

n = 216. Unit of analysis: Cross-party appointees to 23 agencies during the 1979-2014
period. Carter years include 1979-1980 only; Obama years include 2009-2014 only.
Dependent variable: CFscore Difference. Robust standard errors clustered at the two-year
Congress-level are given in parentheses. Table includes fixed effects for each presidency
(baseline category: Carter administration). *** signifies p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
All models are estimated via OLS regression.

Table 6 shows no support for the hypothesis that the cross-party’s power in
the Senate encourages the President to choose cross-party appointees to PBR
agencies whose views are further from the President’s own. The coefficient estimates
for Cross Party Seat Share and Divided Government are negative in all four models
(and statistically significant in two of the four), indicating the President selects crossparty appointees who are closer to his or her ideal point when the cross-party is more
powerful in the Senate. These negative estimates are precisely the opposite of the
demand-side theory’s predication: that a stronger cross-party in the Senate should
pull cross-party appointees in its direction and away from the President’s ideal point.
141

Recall that positive values of CFscore in a Democratic (Republican) administration indicate that
the mean appointee is more conservative (liberal) than the appointing President.
142
To create both Cross-Party Seat Share and Divided Government, independent senators who caucus
with a particular party are classified as members of that party.
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By contrast, the coefficient estimates for Time are positive and statistically
significant in both of the models in which they appear (Models 3 and 4). As the
series progresses—and as partisan sort proceeds—cross-party appointees steadily
become more extreme. When tested in competition with the demand-side theory, the
supply-side theory retains its explanatory power.
None of this is to suggest that individual senators are irrelevant to the
selection of cross-party appointees.143 In particular, the leader of the opposition party
in the Senate (i.e., the minority leader when the President’s party controls the Senate,
or the majority leader when it does not) often plays an outsized role in the process.144
Senate Republican leader Bob Dole sent recommendations for cross-party
appointments to President Clinton throughout the latter’s first term.145 Dole’s
successor as Senate Republican leader, Trent Lott, continued the practice146—in one
case clashing with fellow Republican Senator Orrin Hatch regarding the respective
roles of the leader and Senate committee chairs in cross-party appointments.147
Senate Democratic leaders Tom Daschle and Harry Reid frequently forwarded
names for cross-party appointments to President George W. Bush.148 According to
one account, Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell made a particularly
concerted effort to advance conservative ideologues for cross-party seats under
President Obama, whereas earlier leaders often selected nominees on the basis of

143

See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Independent Agencies, Sometimes in Name Only, N.Y. Times (Aug. 9,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/business/independent-agencies-sometimes-in-nameonly.html (noting that senior senators have been “instrumental” in the selection of SEC
commissioners in recent years).
144
145

Kamen, supra note 59, at A21; see also John Maggs, GOP Lawmakers Oppose Bragg as ITC
Chairman, J. Commerce, May 26, 1994, at 1A (noting that other Republican lawmakers were upset
with Dole’s recommendation for a cross-party seat on the International Trade Commission); Dina
Elboghdady, Owen Sees ICC Post as Capital Opportunity, Orange Cnty. Reg. (Feb. 5, 1995) (noting
that Clinton cross-party appointee to Interstate Commerce Commission had been recommended by
Dole); Lynn Stevens Hume, Dole Urges Clinton To Name Unger, Banking Committee Lawyer, to
SEC Post, Bond Buyer, Sept. 19, 1995, at 1 (noting that Dole had recommended that Clinton name a
Republican Senate aide to a cross-party seat on the SEC).
146
See, e.g., Senate Spat Over Lott’s FCC Picks, Wired (Apr. 10, 1997),
https://www.wired.com/1997/04/senate-spat-over-lotts-fcc-picks.
147
See Michael Grunwald, Sentencing Panel’s Own Terms Are Up, Wash. Post (Aug. 28, 1998),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/08/28/sentencing-panels-own-terms-areup/da055846-230d-448f-b33c-11f596cb1f4d/?utm_term=.47875b15ee4f (noting conflict between Lott
and Hatch). The Sentencing Commission, an advisory panel, is located in the judicial rather than
executive branch and so is excluded from our empirical analysis.
148
See, e.g., Mark Wigfield, Sen. Daschle Recommends Democratic Aide for FCC Post, Dow Jones
News Serv. (Nov. 15, 2001); Judith Burns, Daschle Recommends Hispanic-American Candidate for
SEC, Dow Jones News Serv. (Jan. 7, 2002); Daschle Recommends Goldschmid for SEC, Am.
Banker, Jan. 30, 2002, at 4; Jenny Anderson, Democrats Push S.E.C. Official for Commission Seat,
N.Y.
Times
(May
18,
2005),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE2DA1639F93BA25756C0A9639C8B63;
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home-state connections or recommendations from other caucus members.149 Most
recently, a spokesman for Minority Leader Charles Schumer said in March 2017 that
Senate Democrats “intend to assert our prerogative on nominees as always has been
done,”150 and Schumer has advanced several Democrats for cross-party appointments
in the months since President Trump took office.151
But while the leader of the opposition party in the Senate no doubt plays an
important role in the selection process, we do not believe that the widening
ideological gap between co-party and cross-party appointees can be attributed to
Senate leadership. First, the role of Senate leaders is purely advisory. As a formal
matter, any provision that vested a Senate leader with the statutory power to choose
an executive branch officer would violate the Appointments Clause of Article II.152
And as a practical matter, Presidents do not always follow the suggestions of Senate
leaders. For example, then-Senate Minority Leader Dole complained that President
Clinton often chose “Clinton Republicans” for cross-party seats and ignored Dole’s
recommendations.153 Likewise, then-Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid complained
in 2008 that although he and President George W. Bush “were able to work
cooperatively on [cross-party] nominations” through most of Bush’s second term,
“there has been a notable shift in the President’s stance on these nominations from
one of cooperation to intransigence,” with the Bush White House rejecting several of
Reid’s suggestions during the final year of the Bush presidency.154
Second, when Senate leaders recommend nominees, they do so in the shadow
of the White House’s range of acceptable options. Thus, even when the President
follows the opposition party leader’s recommendation, it would be a mistake to
attribute the appointment to the opposition party leader alone. Former aides to Senate
leaders describe a back-and-forth process whereby the leader proposes an appointee
See Daniel Foster, Agent McConnell, Nat’l Rev., June 3, 2013, at 30.
Kelcee Griffis, Trump Nixes Rosenworcel Nomination To Return to FCC, Law360 (Mar. 2, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/897483/trump-nixes-rosenworcel-nomination-to-return-to-fcc
(quoting Schumer spokesman).
151
See, e.g., David Lieberman, President Trump Renominates Jessica Rosenworcel to FCC, Deadline
(June 14, 2017), http://deadline.com/2017/06/president-trump-renominates-jessica-rosenworcel-fcc1202113089 (noting that Schumer recommended Trump cross-party nominee); Harper Nedig,
Schumer Recommends Consumer Advocate for FTC, The Hill (May 8, 2017),
http://thehill.com/regulation/finance/332535-schumer-recommends-consumer-advocate-for-ftc.
152
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 , 127-37 (1976) (striking down provision in the Federal Election
Campaign Act that purported to authorize the President pro tempore of the Senate and Speaker of the
House to choose four members of the FEC).
153
Kamen, supra note 59, at A21.
154
Martin Kady II, Reid Letter Shows White House Rejected Nominee Compromise, Politico (Feb.
28,
2008),
http://www.politico.com/blogs/politico-now/2008/02/reid-letter-shows-white-houserejected-nominee-compromise-006621 (quoting letter from Reid to White House Chief of Staff
Joshua Bolton). Reid’s letter also made the surprising—and flatly false—claim that “I have the
statutory authority to make recommendations to the President for Democratic positions on
independent boards and commissions.” Id. (emphasis added).
149
150
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to a cross-party seat and the White House either accepts the nomination or offers a
counterproposal.155 These negotiations are sometimes bound up in bargaining
between the White House and senators over issues unrelated or tangential to the
appointment in question.156
Third, insofar as cross-party appointments are driven by the opposition
party’s Senate leader, we would expect that leader’s influence to be at its peak when
the opposition party holds more seats in the Senate. Yet as illustrated by Table 6, our
data do not bear out that prediction. Remarkably, the extent to which Presidents
choose genuine cross-partisans for multimember commission seats has no apparent
relationship to the political power of the opposition party leader.
Fourth and finally, while the median Senate Democrat and median Senate
Republican have grown farther apart ideologically over the course of our study
period, we see much less ideological movement among the party’s respective Senate
leaders. Figure 8 compares the CFscores for the Senate Democratic and Republican
leaders, denoted with bold lines, with the median appointees to Democratic and
Republican seats on agencies with PBRs; appointees to co-party seats are denoted
with thin, solid lines, whereas appointees to cross-party seats are denoted with dotted
lines. As the figure shows, changes over time in the median CFscores of cross-party
appointees bear little discernable relationship to changes in the CFscores of Senate
leaders. For example, Mitch McConnell, who led the Senate Republicans through the
Obama years, has a CFscore that is 0.030 points lower (less conservative) than
Howard Baker, the Senate Republican leader under Carter, whereas the median
cross-party (Republican) appointee under Obama is 0.386 points more conservative
than the median cross-party appointee under Carter. In other words, Republicans
appointed by Democratic Presidents grew much more conservative even while the
Senate Republican leader (as measured by CFscore) grew slightly less so. Likewise,
Harry Reid, who led the Senate Democrats during George W. Bush’s second term,
has a CFscore that is only 0.194 points lower than that of Robert Byrd, the Senate
Democratic leader under Reagan, while the median CFscore for George W. Bush’s
cross-party (Democratic) appointees is 1.190 points lower than the median CFscore
for Reagan’s cross-party appointees. That is, Democrats appointed by Republican
Presidents grew substantially more liberal even while the CFscore for the Senate
Democratic leader barely budged. In sum, we find little evidence to suggest that the
divergence between co-party and cross-party appointees over our study period can be
explained by an increase in the power of opposition party senators or Senate leaders
in the selection process.

155

Telephone Interview with Ronald Weich, former chief counsel to Sen. Reid (Aug. 29, 2017);
Telephone Interview with Steve Seale, former chief counsel to Sen. Lott (Aug. 30, 2017).
156
E-mail from Senator Jon Kyl, Former Senate Minority Whip, to authors (Aug. 25, 2017, 16:33
EDT) (on file with authors) (“[T]he minority is always looking for leverage, and nominations for
anything work.”).
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Figure 8: Senate Leaders and Appointees to Agencies with PBRs

3. Search Costs
Along with increased partisan sort, another broad social phenomenon may
have increased PBRs’ bite occurred during this period: an information-technology
revolution that slashed the cost of obtaining data on nominees. Forty years ago,
learning about the detailed political views of a potential appointee might require
using one’s Rolodex to contact members of the appointee’s social or professional
circle and investing the time and political capital to convince these mutual
connections to speak candidly (and, naturally, as a prerequisite, one would need to
have the connections and status to pull this off). Today, one can procure similar
information with a few keystrokes—as we did. As a result, a wide variety of
interested parties—including Senate staffers, activists, and journalists—can
inexpensively obtain information regarding the ideologies of potential appointees. In
light of the reduction in the costs associated with obtaining this information, perhaps
the President’s ability to present conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans as
stealth nominees has diminished.
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While this search-costs hypothesis has some appeal, we are skeptical that it is
driving our results for three reasons. First, this hypothesis understates the amount of
information concerning potential appointees’ donations that was publicly accessible
throughout this period. The FEC has a long-established reputation for facilitating
public access to its data.157 For virtually the entire period, the FEC considered reports
on receipts and FEC-generated indices of these receipts to be subject to the Freedom
of Information Act, and thus endeavored to provide “the fullest possible disclosure”
to the public.158 In 1980, Congress required the FEC to make reports submitted by
campaigns “available for public inspection,” and to “develop a filing, coding, and
cross-indexing system” to facilitate public access.159 The FEC met this obligation
that same year.160 Since 1996, the FEC has provided to the public comprehensive
electronic records of campaign contributions dating back to the late 1970s.161 In
1998, the FEC debuted an Internet-based search function that allows users to search
the FEC’s online database for specific donors by name.162
Access to campaign contributions data likely was more difficult prior to the
current era of searchable online databases. Still, interested parties had the means to
access this information throughout the study period. Even during the years in which
identifying contributors required reviewing indices of campaign contributions, the
stakes to Presidents, senators, and affected interest groups of placing a “disloyal”
appointee on a board or commission likely were sufficiently high—and the resources
available to these individuals and entities sufficiently deep—to outweigh these
relatively modest search costs.
Second, political donations are but one of several ways to convey an
individual’s partisan affiliation. Presidents and senators could employ many other
screens to divine potential appointees’ partisan affiliations: for instance, whether an
individual consistently votes in party primaries, has a record of volunteering for
157

See R. Sam Garrett, The Federal Election Commission: Overview and Selected Issues for
Congress, CRS Rep. for Congress, Dec. 22, 2015, at 17 (“[T]he FEC generally is praised for its role in
publicizing campaign finance data.”); Jeremy Gaunt, ed., A Rocky Decade Later, the FEC Gets Little
Respect, Campaign Practices Rep., Feb. 11, 1985, at 2 (“[M]ost . . . are willing to credit the agency
with at least one major success. . . . [T]he FEC has built on earlier attempts to make campaign finance
data open to public scrutiny and has made disclosure of campaign dollars and accepted and expected
part of the electoral process.”).
158
See 11 C.F.R. §§ 5.2(a), 5.4(a)(1) (2010); accord 65 Fed. Reg. 9206 (Feb. 24, 2000); 52 Fed. Reg.
39213 (Oct. 21, 1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 23638 (June 24, 1987); 50 Fed. Reg. 50778 (Dec. 12, 1985); 45
Fed Reg. 31292 (May 13, 1980) (versions of the rule in effect between 1980 and 2010); but see 44
Fed. Reg. 33368 (June 8, 1979) (stating that FOIA does not apply to reports of receipts and related
indices).
159
Pub. L. 96–187, § 311(a)(3)-(4) (Jan. 8, 1980).
160
Telephone Interview with Senior Public Affairs Specialist, Public Records Branch, Federal
Election Commission (May 30, 2017).
161
Press Release, Federal Election Commission, FEC Launches New Web Info, July 21, 1998,
available at http://classic.fec.gov/press/press1998/websrch.htm (last visited June 20, 2017).
162
Id.
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political campaigns, or participates in a political party or party-connected group.
Indeed, the secular decline in mass participation in civic activity over the past several
generations suggests that, in some respects, it may have been easier to discern an
individual’s partisan affiliation in 1979 than in 2014.163
Third, we construct what should be a relatively easy test for the search-costs
hypothesis – and obtain null results. This test exploits the FEC’s introduction of a
search function for its online database of campaign contributions on July 21, 1998,
which constituted the single greatest reduction in search costs during this period. If
the search-costs hypothesis is doing any significant work, we would expect to see it
here. Yet we do not.
Model 1 in Table 7 is similar to the regression models presented in Table 6
above, except that here, we add a dummy variable denoting whether the nomination
occurred after the search function for the FEC’s online database became publicly
accessible on July 21, 1998.164 A positive, statistically significant estimate for this
coefficient would support the alternative hypothesis that greater access to
information reduced the White House’s ability to get a “cross-partisan in name only”
past opposition party senators. Model 1, however, shows a null result.
Model 2 tests a slight variation on the alternative hypothesis. What if
interested parties gradually began to adapt to the FEC website’s new search function,
whether because they learned about the function over time through word of mouth or
because old-guard staffers were secularly replaced with more internet-savvy political
operatives? Instead of a discrete jump in effect size following the roll-out of the
search function, we would expect the time trend in the dependent variable to pick up
speed after July 21, 1998. In other words, we would expect a positive coefficient on
the interaction of the “date of nomination” and “nomination after July 21, 1998”
variables tests for this phenomenon. As Model 2 shows, however, the coefficient on
the interaction term is statistically insignificant and, in fact, weakly negative. 165 In
163

Further, to the extent that members of Congress are consulted in executive appointments, the
fraying personal connections between legislators and their individual constituents presents an
additional impediment to evaluating a potential appointee’s partisan loyalty that is more significant in
the later years of the study period. Compare Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Home Style: House Members in
their Districts (1978), with Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The Challenge of Congressional Representation
(2013).
164
Observations in Table 7 are limited to the 145 cross-party appointees for whom we were able to
obtain the exact date of nomination.
165
We also ran a series of placebo tests, substituting July 21 of the years 1993-1997 and 1999-2007 in
place of the “Nomination after July 21, 1998” variable and interaction-term component. These dates
have no special relevance; we included them simply to determine whether the coefficient estimates in
models including these dates differ in any meaningful way from the estimates reported in Table 7. The
results of these placebo tests are substantially similar to those reported in Table 7 (although the
divided government variable lacks statistical significance in most of these placebo models, as
expected).
To determine whether a discontinuity in cross-appointee ideology exists around July 21,
1998, we constructed a regression-discontinuity model. However, a relative lack of observations
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other words, we find little evidence that the ideological distance between the
President and cross-party appointees increased at a faster pace after the FEC’s
website search rollout.
Table 7: Effects of FEC Search Functionality on Cross-Appointee Selection
Model 1

Model 2

Divided Government

-0.304
(0.155)

-0.332
(0.170)

Date of Nomination

0.042**
(0.015)

0.045*
(0.017)

Nomination after July 21, 1998?

0.036
(0.272)

40.636
(98.771)

--

-0.020
(0.049)

Date of Nomination * Nomination after
July 21, 1998?

n = 145. Unit of analysis: Cross-party appointees during the 1979-2014 period for
whom we know the exact date of nomination (a subset of the dataset used in previous
models). Dependent variable: CFscore Difference. *** signifies p < 0.001, ** p <
0.01, * p < 0.05. All models are estimated via OLS regression. Parameter estimates
for the intercepts are omitted.

To sum up so far: Our results are consistent with a supply-side story in which
partisan sort starting in the 1980s tightened the relationship between party affiliation
and ideology, and so the preferences of cross-party appointees increasingly diverged
from those of the appointing President. Our results are less consistent with a
demand-side story in which the power of the opposition party in the Senate (or the
influence of its leader) drives change over time in the ideological composition of
multimember agencies. Finally, we find no support for the hypothesis that an
Internet-induced reduction in search costs has prevented recent Presidents from
around the July 21, 1998 cut-point impeded the analysis; using any reasonable set of parameter
assumptions, the rdbwselect function in R recommended bandwidths of approximately 2 years –
hardly a knife-edge. Using this bandwidth, the model reported a statistically significant, positive
discontinuity at the cut-point. But we do not put much stock in this result; given the unacceptably
large bandwidth size, the model likely is picking up the well-documented time trend and misreporting
it as a “knife-edge” discontinuous jump.
Finally, we constructed a regression-kink model, which tests for a discontinuous change in
slope, rather than an upward shift in the regression curve, at around this date. The theory here is that
interested parties may have learned about (and learned how to use) the FEC’s searchable database
gradually, and therefore we might expect a change in the rate of growth in the ideological gap after
this date, rather than an abrupt increase. This model reported null results, but, once again, serious
bandwidth selection issues prevent firm conclusions.
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filling cross-party seats with individuals whose campaign contributions reveal
themselves to be out of step with their party of registration.
4. Identity Signaling
Finally, the notion that appointment-seeking members donate solely to
convey that they are loyal party members may bear on this analysis. Consider, for
instance, a highly regarded product safety lawyer angling for a seat on the Consumer
Product Safety Commission. Her qualifications are unimpeachable, but her
involvement in partisan politics is either trivial or dated.166 She may therefore benefit
from donating to her party’s candidates solely to convey that she is a member of that
party. This rationale stands apart from the sincere-versus-strategic dichotomy
discussed in subsection II.B.3. Although this behavior obviously is not a sincere
expression of closely held beliefs, neither is it strategic in the sense that it is designed
to misrepresent an individual’s ideological preferences. It simply broadcasts: “I am a
member of this team.”
If this motivation for political giving is widely held, then changes in
appointees’ ideal point estimates over time might not capture genuine changes in
their political views. Rather, if members of the political class donate mechanistically
to candidates on their party’s ticket, and the ideological composition of the ticket
changes over time as a result of partisan sort among candidates, then the observed
longitudinal changes in appointees’ ideal point estimates would be epiphenomenal.
Phrased another way, whereas a Washington lawyer could show loyalty to the
Republican Party in 1970 by donating the Nelson Rockefeller, today he might do so
by giving to Ted Cruz. Neither action is necessarily infused with much meaning;
they both convey party loyalty—and, perhaps, nothing more.167
We acknowledge that partisan sort among candidates may encourage donors
interested solely in signaling their party loyalty to support more extreme candidates
in 2014 than in 1979. But we caution that this theory’s explanatory power is limited.
First, it cannot account for the fact that co-party and cross-party appointees differed
markedly throughout the 1980s and 1990s. That Democrats selected by President
Carter exhibit sharply different donation activity than Democrats selected by

166

This example is loosely based on Marietta Robinson, a product-safety lawyer with a long career
representing both plaintiffs and defendants. Robinson ran as a Democrat for a Michigan Supreme
Court seat in 2000, served in several nonpartisan positions in the 2000s, and was appointed by
President Obama to a Democratic seat on the CPSC in 2013.
167
Cf. Vaclav Havel, The Power of the Powerless (1978) (“I think it can safely be assumed that the
overwhelming majority of shopkeepers never think about the slogans they put in their windows, nor
do they use them to express their real opinions. That poster was delivered to our greengrocer from the
enterprise headquarters along with the onions and carrots. He put them all into the window simply
because it has been done that way for years, because everyone does it, and because that is the way it
has to be. If he were to refuse, there could be trouble.”).
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President Reagan casts doubt on the notion that appointment-seekers’ ideal point
estimates merely reflect the ideal points of their party’s candidates.
Second, and somewhat to our surprise, we found that appointees to PBR
agencies routinely make contributions to candidates from both political parties. Even
among appointees to the high-profile, highly politicized FCC, fully a third of
appointees in our dataset (11 out of 33) donated to both Democratic and Republican
candidates. If likely nominees are using campaign contributions solely to signal that
they are on “Team Blue” or “Team Red,” the signals they are sending are remarkably
noisy.
Third, even with the trend towards polarized parties, donors who give
exclusively to candidates from one party still have a wide variety of options from
which to choose. In 1980, the mean Republican candidate on a general election ballot
for state or federal office had a CFscore of 0.770, while the mean Democratic
candidate’s score was -0.365. (Recall that a higher CFscore indicates greater
conservatism.) By 2014, those means were 1.046 and -0.985, respectively. But the
standard deviations around these means also increased between 1980 and 2014: from
0.368 to 0.573 for Republicans from 0.529 to 0.668 for Democrats.168 In other words,
party-loyal donors in 2014 could donate to a candidate who adopted the posture of a
1980-style Democrat (or 1980-style Republican) and who still was located within
one standard deviation of the current party mean. That Democratic (Republican)
appointees did not do so, and instead chose to give to more liberal (conservative)
appointees, provides further support for the claim that appointees themselves have
grown more extreme.
III. IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
We can now say with some confidence that PBRs are more than paper
tigers—that they do indeed lead Presidents to choose cross-party appointees with
divergent ideological preferences. Our results have clear implications for the leading
accounts of partisan balance requirements in the political science and administrative
law literatures. Our results also suggest avenues for future research on the effects of
PBRs. This last Part considers those implications and potential extensions of our
project.
A. The Monitoring Account
One perspective on PBRs in the political science and administrative law
literature emphasizes the relationship between PBRs and the cost of monitoring
agency actions. PBRs can reduce monitoring costs for Congress in three ways. First,
See Adam Bonica, “All Recipients, 1979-2014” [data file], Database on Ideology, Money in
Politics,
and
Elections
(DIME)
(Aug.
16,
2016),
available
at
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/dime (last visited July 3, 2017).
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minority party commissioners are likely to sound a “fire alarm” if the majority on the
commission embarks on a potentially controversial course of action.169 These “fire
alarms” make it easier for lawmakers to keep an eye on agencies: Instead of
reviewing every agency action individually, Congress can focus on instances in
which minority party members dissent from a commission decision.170 Second,
beyond simply sounding an alarm, minority commissioners might further reduce the
costs of congressional oversight by providing lawmakers with information about the
consequences of agency actions as well as ways to overturn those actions.171 Third,
and relatedly, the same fire alarms that alert Congress to questionable commission
decisions also alert the courts.172 This third mechanism can be considered as part of a
multipronged strategy of congressional control: Congress creates agencies subject to
PBRs; Congress also provides for judicial review of agency actions; and minority
commissioners alert the courts to instances in which agency actions deviate from
statutory directives.
The monitoring account might lead us to expect that lawmakers would be
most likely to impose PBRs when they are most worried about the executive branch
straying from their own policy preferences. Consistent with this expectation, David
Lewis observes that the percentage of new agencies with appointment limitations
such as PBRs is highest in periods of divided government. 173 Note, though, that
while Lewis’s finding is consistent with the monitoring account, it does not confirm
that account. Even if opposing party lawmakers seek to reduce monitoring costs by
imposing PBRs on new multimember agencies, their efforts may prove fruitless.
What we can say is that certain empirical findings make the monitoring
account appear more plausible. For the monitoring account to be accurate, a
Barkow, supra note 87, at 41 (“[W]hen an agency is composed of members of different parties, it
has a built-in monitoring system for interests on both sides because that type of body is more likely to
produce a dissent if the agency goes too far in one direction. That dissent, in turn, serves as a ‘fire
alarm’ that alerts Congress and the public at large that the agency’s decision might merit closer
scrutiny.” (footnotes omitted)). The origins of the “fire alarm” theory trace back to work by political
scientists Matthew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. See Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas
Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci.
165 (1984).
170
Alexander Bolton, Collegial Leadership Structures, Ideological Diversity, and Policymaking in the
United States 12 (Aug. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript).
171
Id. The presence of minority commissioners also may encourage majority commissioners to
provide greater information than they otherwise would. Even the prospect of a dissent may serve an
information-forcing function, compelling commissioners in the majority to provide more fulsome
explanations for their decisions in an effort to dampen the potential dissenters’ fire alarm. Cf.
Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth”: Heightened Judicial Review in the Absence of
Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1589, 1605, 1657--60 (2014) (arguing that the prospect of
inspector-general investigations, congressional hearings, or judicial review may compel agencies to
provide better-reasoned explanations for their actions).
172
Bolton, supra note 170, at 13.
173
David E. Lewis, The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic
Performance 54 (2008).
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necessary but not sufficient condition is that PBRs actually lead to ideologically
diverse agencies with minority members who will alert Congress and the courts if
agency leaders stray from legislative preferences or statutory directives. In that
respect, our finding that the ideological preferences of cross-party appointees in
recent years have indeed diverged from the preferences of the appointing President
supports the monitoring account’s claims.
Importantly, however, the fact that PBRs produce ideological diversity on
multimember agencies does not prove that PBRs succeed in reducing monitoring
costs for Congress and the courts. First, members whose ideological preferences
diverge from the White House occupant’s may still exhibit loyalty toward the
President who appointed them. Lee Epstein and Eric Posner have documented a
powerful “loyalty effect” among Supreme Court Justices, who are more likely to
vote with the Solicitor General when the President who appointed them remains in
office.174 This loyalty effect is distinct from the phenomenon of Supreme Court
Justices tending to support the administration when the President is of the same party
as the Justice’s appointer; the loyalty effect is person-specific rather than partyspecific. A similar loyalty effect among members of PBR agencies might lead a
conservative Republican to support the policies of a Democratic President who
appointed her (and likewise for a liberal Democrat appointed by a Republican
President). A loyalty effect among cross-party appointees might undermine the
monitoring value of ideological diversity at multimember agencies, because minority
party members might be reluctant to interfere with the agenda of a President to
whom they feel gratitude.
Second, even in the absence of a loyalty effect, agency members whose
ideological preferences diverge from the President’s might do little to reduce
monitoring costs for Congress and the courts. Minority party members might be
excluded from access to information about agency decisionmaking, or they might be
reluctant to blow the whistle on their majority party colleagues, or their “fire alarms”
might go unheeded by lawmakers and judges. Evaluating the strength of the
monitoring account thus requires more than simply knowing how PBRs affect the
ideological composition of multimember agencies. We would need to know whether
the ideological composition of multimember agencies has observable effects on
interactions between agencies and Congress, and between agencies and courts.175
While the analysis above cannot answer all questions regarding the
monitoring account’s accuracy, our topline results do provide guidance for
researchers studying this subject. Most significantly, our findings suggest that the
174

Epstein & Posner, supra note 100.
One of us has begun a project of using empirical methods to study the effectiveness of
congressional oversight of administrative agencies. See Brian D. Feinstein, Congress in the
Administrative State, 95 Wash. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2943074. Studying the relationship between ideological composition and
congressional oversight is a potentially fruitful path for future research.
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effect of PBRs on monitoring costs may be time-variant: how PBRs affected
interactions between agencies and Congress—and between agencies and courts—in
the 1980s is not necessarily predictive with regard to later years. Our results suggest
that the effects of PBRs on the ideological composition of multimember agencies
from the Clinton presidency onward are quite unlike the effects under Presidents
Carter, Reagan, and George H.W. Bush, and so the follow-on consequences for
monitoring costs may be different for later periods than for earlier ones.
B. The Deliberative Account
A second account of PBRs (which is distinct from, but not inconsistent with,
the monitoring account above) draws from the social psychology literature on group
polarization. Group polarization occurs “when an initial tendency of individual group
members toward a given direction is enhanced following group discussion.”176
Numerous studies have documented this phenomenon.177 Cass Sunstein, who is
largely responsible for bringing the group polarization literature to the attention of
administrative law scholars, highlights two explanations for the observed patterns of
polarization. One emphasizes “social comparison”: people want to be perceived
favorably by their peers, and so when surrounded by others with liberal
(conservative) views, they will seek favor by adjusting their own views to be more
liberal (conservative).178 A second explanation stresses “limited argument pools”:
individuals are influenced by the arguments they encounter, and an individual
confronted with only liberal (or only conservative) arguments is likely to move
further in that direction. Both of these explanations might suggest that while
individuals surrounded by others with likeminded views will grow more extreme,
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Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarization: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 50 J. Personality &
Soc. Psychol. 1141, 1141 (1986).
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Early experiments involved 18- and 19-year-old students in Paris who were asked about their
attitudes toward France’s then-President, Charles de Gaulle, and about their attitudes toward the
United States. Initial attitudes toward de Gaulle were “mildly favorable”; after group discussion,
sentiments toward the President became even more favorable. 177 Initial attitudes toward the United
States were “mildly negative”; these views tended to become more negative following discussion. In
both cases, group deliberation pushed group members toward the extreme. Roger Brown, Social
Psychology 223--24 (2d ed. 1986).
In another study, subjects were presented with traffic felony scenarios and asked to rate
defendants’ guilt (from “definitely not guilty” to “definitely guilty”). They then discussed their
impressions and re-rated the defendants. The discussion process consistently led subjects to become
more extreme in their views. With respect to scenarios in which most subjects initially considered the
defendant to be guilty, group discussion strengthened their confidence in that view. When most
subjects initially considered the defendant to be innocent, discussion likewise pushed subjects even
further toward the innocence extreme. See David G. Myers & Martin F. Kaplan, Group-Induced
Polarization in Simulated Juries, 2 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 63 (1976).
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Sunstein, supra note 13, at 88-89.
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individuals exposed to a diversity of viewpoints may become more moderate. 179 This
diversity-leads-to-depolarization hypothesis draws some support in the social
psychology literature, though this effect is stronger for group members confronting a
problem for the first time than for group members dealing with familiar and muchdebated questions.180
Sunstein argues that the social psychology literature on group polarization
and depolarization produces potentially useful insights for agency design. “An
independent agency that is all Democratic, or all Republican, might polarize toward
an extreme position, likely more extreme than that of the median Democrat or
Republican, and possibly more extreme than any member standing alone,” he
writes.181 “A requirement of bipartisan membership can operate as a check against
movements of this kind.”182 The verbs “might” and “can” are important:
extrapolations from laboratory experiments to the real world of multimember federal
agencies raise questions of external validity. Moreover, even in the absence of PBRs,
agency commissioners may be exposed to a rich pool of arguments from sources
other than their colleagues. Commissioners likely encounter arguments from lawyers
who practice before the agency, lobbyists who seek to influence agency action, think
tanks inside the Beltway, and—on especially high-profile issues—news media.
Nonetheless, the literature on group polarization offers a potential explanation as to
how PBRs might affect agency decisionmaking. Here, as elsewhere, ideological
diversity may depolarize.183
Like the monitoring account, the deliberative account is difficult to verify
directly. What we can say is that for the deliberative account to be accurate, it must
first be the case that PBRs have the immediate effect of producing ideological
diversity. In this respect, our findings are supportive of the deliberative account.
179

Id. at 89, 118--19.
See Brown, supra note 177, at 226.
181
See Sunstein, supra note 178, at 103.
182
Id. In a similar vein, Rachel Barkow writes:
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[A] partisan balance requirement . . . can avoid extremely partisan decisions . . . . As a wealth
of empirical research demonstrates, a group composed solely of ideologically like-minded
people tends toward extreme decision making. Liberals and conservatives alike become more
liberal and conservative, respectively, when they deliberate only with likeminded people. . . .
[A] commission of five members all of the same party would be even more polarized than
one in which a bare majority is of the same party.
Barkow, supra note 87, at 40-41.
183
To be sure, partisan balance requirements theoretically could have the opposite effect. Considering
the possibility of partisan balance requirements for judicial panels, Cass Sunstein and Tom Miles note
that “[p]erhaps both Republican and Democratic appointees would conceive of themselves, to a
somewhat greater degree, as political partisans, simply because the requirement of mixed composition
would suggest as much.” Cass R. Sunstein & Thomas J. Miles, Depoliticizing Administrative Law, 58
Duke L.J. 2193, 2228 (2009).
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Increasing party polarization appears to have the perhaps-unexpected effect of
increasing the ideological heterogeneity of multimember agencies. No longer do
Democratic Presidents fill seats on boards and commissions with likeminded liberals
who differ only in their party registration. No longer do Republican Presidents stock
multimember agencies with conservative Democrats and conservative Republicans.
Instead, we observe PBRs leading to multimember agencies with a mix of liberal
Democratic and conservative Republican members.
That members are afforded opportunities to deliberate is a second necessary
condition for the deliberative account. If decisions are preordained based on the
views of the chair or those of an autonomous professional staff, with the
multimember structure merely serving as a rubber stamp, then deliberation either
will not occur or will be irrelevant to policy outcomes. Although the evidence is
limited, we think this second condition is indeed met at most multimembers
agencies. Commissioners are generally able to hire their own dedicated staff, and
thus have the capacity to critically evaluate proposals from the chair or others and to
suggest informed alternatives.184 Moreover, most multimember agencies are required
to undertake official action only at or after a formal meeting with a quorum, which
affords at least an opportunity to deliberate.185
But even assuming that these preconditions are met—namely, that PBRs
foster ideological diversity and that members have opportunities to deliberate—it
does not necessarily follow that deliberation actually occurs, much less that minds
are changed. The question of whether ideological diversity on multimember agencies
has any effect on decisional outputs still remains unanswered. But while we do not
seek to answer that question here, we believe that it may be possible in future
research to assess the deliberative account in further detail. For example, one might
ask whether agencies that are more ideologically diverse are also less likely to be
reversed by courts, or less likely to commit “infractions” of other kinds (i.e., actions
that elicit criticism from inspectors general, the Government Accountability Office,
or major newspapers).186 One might also look at whether ideological diversity on
multimember agencies affects voting patterns of individual agency members.
Analogously, Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein have found evidence suggesting that
on three-member circuit court panels, the presence of an ideological minority has a
moderating effect on the votes of judges in the majority. 187 Richard Revesz has
documented a similar phenomenon in environmental law cases decided by the D.C.
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See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 1111, 1168 (2000) (describing members’ ability to
select and supervise their own staffs).
185
See id. at 1236--94 (listing meeting requirements).
186
On the measurement of agency “infractions,” see Feinstein, supra note 175, at 24--25.
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Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823 (2006).
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Circuit.188 While these authors use party affiliation as a proxy for ideology, our
approach of using appointees’ campaign contributions can allow for a richer analysis
of ideological diversity and depolarization in the agency context. Down the road, we
hope to examine whether ideologically diversity leads agency members to gravitate
together or pull apart.
C. The Obstruction Account
A third and final perspective on partisan balance requirements posits that
PBRs unconstitutionally interfere with presidential control over the executive
branch. The Justice Department under President George H.W. Bush made a brief
argument to this effect in a 1989 Office of Legal Counsel memorandum: according
to the memo, PBRs violate Article II’s Appointments Clause189 because “[t]he only
congressional check that the Constitution places on the President’s power to appoint
‘principal officers’ is the advice and consent of the Senate.”190 The Office of Legal
Counsel listed PBRs as one of “ten types of legislative provisions commonly
included in proposed legislation that weaken the Presidency” and that the executive
branch should “consistently and forcefully resist[].”191
A more full-throated version of this argument emerges from recent work by
Ronald Krotoszynski and coauthors. Krotoszynski et al. rely on the Supreme Court’s
2010 decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board,192 a case involving a five-member board created to regulate auditing of
securities issuers. While the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)
is not subject to a PBR, its members were protected by “dual for-cause removal
limitations”: they could be removed only by the Securities and Exchange
Commission and only for cause, and the SEC commissioners could be removed by
the President only for cause.193 The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts,
188

Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717
(1997).
189
See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all . . . Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments”).
190
Common Legislative Encroachments on Executive Branch Authority, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel
248, 250 (July 27, 1989).
191
Id. at 248. In a separate vein, law professor Jamin Raskin has argued that PBRs violate the First
Amendment and the principle of equal protection because they discriminate on the basis of party
affiliation. See Jamin B. Raskin, “A Complicated and Indirect Encroachment”: Is the Federal Election
Commission Unconstitutionally Composed?, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 609 (2000).
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561 U.S. 477 (2010).
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The SEC’s organic statute actually imposes no limitation on the removal of commissioners.
However, the parties in Free Enterprise Fund both agreed that SEC commissioners are protected by
an unwritten for-cause removal limitation. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487.
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held that “the dual for-cause limitations on the removal of Board members
contravene the Constitution’s separation of powers.”194 But the opinion arguably
stands for the broader proposition that the President must have “meaningful
oversight and control powers over independent agencies.”195
Krotoszynski and coauthors argue that PBRs, when coupled with for-cause
removal limitations for agency members, potentially violate the broader separationof-powers principle embodied in the Free Enterprise Fund decision. They write:
Statutory partisan balance requirements quite literally force Presidents to rely on
political enemies to carry out their executive duties. . . . This is especially troubling
considering the increased polarization present in American political parties. . . .
Essentially, statutory partisan balance requirements foster a politically polarizing
environment at the heads of independent agencies. . . . [T]hese statutory partisan
balance requirements force Presidents to carry out their executive duties with
contentious and highly polarized agency heads . . . [and] preclude a President from
appointing a sufficient number of agency commissioners in agreement with her
political philosophy to overcome the debilitating effect of partisanship.196

Notably, Krotoszynski and coauthors do not claim that PBRs are always
unconstitutional. They write: “If Congress requires the President to appoint political
opponents to an independent federal agency, but does not also entrench such persons
with a fixed term of office or good cause protection against removal, it is difficult to
see how a partisan balance requirement on these facts would significantly impede the
President’s ability to oversee and direct the agency’s operations.”197 In their view, it
is the combination of PBRs and for-cause removal protections, rather than either of
these provisions individually, that render a large swath of administrative agencies
unconstitutional. They conclude: “Congress should have the choice of mandating
partisan balance requirements or insulating principal officers who serve on agency
heads from removal; it should not be permitted to impose both conditions
concurrently.”198
There is, on reflection, something curious about the claim that for-cause
removal protections are constitutionally allowable but that the combination of PBRs
and removal protections raises problems. Consider the case of the SEC, a fivemember body whose commissioners serve staggered five-year terms, with one term
ending in June of every year.199 Suppose there were no PBR and so a two-term
President (say, President Obama) would have opportunities to fill every position on
the commission. Assuming that President Obama could get all of his nominees
194
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confirmed, he would be able to stock the commission with likeminded members
during his eight years in office (indeed, by year five). President Trump would then
inherit an SEC with five liberal Democratic commissioners. Each June, President
Trump would be able to appoint a conservative Republican to the expiring term, but
it would not be until June 2019—more than halfway through his firm term—that he
could achieve a conservative Republican majority on the SEC.
At least arguably, partisan balance requirements make Presidents less
“rel[iant] on political enemies” insofar as they ensure that Presidents inherit
commissions with only a bare majority of members hailing from the opposite party.
In the example above, President Trump would be able to achieve a conservative
Republican majority on the SEC the first time that a Democratic-appointed
commissioner’s term expires. In an analysis of 12 multimember agencies subject to
PBRs, Neil Devins and David Lewis find that following a change in party control of
the White House, it takes an average of 13 to 14 months for the new President to
obtain a majority of co-partisans on a commission.200 In other words, if historical
patterns hold, it will take President Trump an average of 13 to 14 months from
inauguration—March or April of 2018—before a majority of commissioners are
Republican. By contrast, it takes an average of 26 months for a new President to
appoint an absolute majority of members (i.e., until March of 2019 before a majority
of commissioners are Trump appointees).201
Thus, the extent to which PBRs make a President reliant on commissioners
whose ideologies differ from the President’s own views depends critically on
whether PBRs actually push Democratic Presidents to appoint conservative
Republicans (and, vice versa, whether PBRs actually push Republican Presidents to
appoint liberal Democrats). If PBRs impose only a weak constraint, such that a
Democratic President can appoint liberals to both Democratic and Republican seats,
then it will take longer for a new conservative Republican President to fill a
commission with conservatives. If PBRs impose a stronger constraint on ideology,
then a new conservative Republican President will be able to assemble conservative
majorities on commissions much more quickly. From this perspective, our results
should be reassuring to those who worry that multimember agencies subject to PBRs
whose members enjoy for-causal removal protection will interfere with the
President’s pursuit of his or her policy agenda. As PBRs become increasingly
effective at generating ideological diversity on multimember agencies, they may in
fact do less to obstruct the sitting President rather than more.
CONCLUSION
Our topline result can be summarized in a single sentence: Since the mid1990s (but not in the decade and a half before), partisan balance requirements have
200
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Devins & Lewis, supra note 79, at 470. Devins and Lewis analyze data from the 1921-2005 period.
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shaped the ideological composition of multimember agencies by forcing Presidents
to fill cross-party seats with appointees whose preferences diverge from their own. In
other words, partisan balance requirements indeed bite, but they have come to do so
only relatively recently. These findings are broadly consistent with supply-side
developments: as ideology and party identification have become more closely
correlated, Presidents have found it more difficult to identify competent cross-party
appointees whose policy preferences they share. And as a consequence, the decadeslong trend toward partisan sort in American politics has led to multimember boards
and commissions comprised of very few cross-party appointees sharing the ideology
of the President who appointed them. Democratic Presidents may still be on the hunt
for liberal Republicans to appoint to cross-party seats (and Republican Presidents for
conservative Democrats), but with fewer of these creatures left in the wild,
Presidents increasingly are compelled to select their ideological opponents for crossparty seats.
Our results suggest a novel twist on the standard narrative of partisan
polarization. The conventional wisdom holds that increased partisan polarization has
strained the architecture of government. At agencies subject to PBRs, however, the
effects of partisan sort may be salutary. Partisan sort may lead Presidents to select
bona fide cross-party members, who in turn serve as in-house monitors and
counterbalance tendencies that might drive groups to go to extremes.
We cannot yet say definitively that PBRs reduce the costs borne by Congress
and the courts in watching over multimember agencies. Nor can we confidently say
that PBRs improve deliberative processes inside agencies. This study is a first step
toward resolving those questions, but it is not a final answer. What we can conclude,
based on the data analyzed here, is that PBRs appear to enhance the ideological
diversity of multimember boards and commissions throughout the federal
bureaucracy. At a time of heightened concerns regarding partisan polarization in
Washington and across the country, that in itself is no mean feat.
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